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Wouldn't someone still be able to send mail from jon@jrơck.us and even have it pass DMARC and DKIM checks if they bought that domain? (last o being a ơ [ơ]) I
by sokoloff 8y ago
Wouldn't someone still be able to send mail from jon@jrơck.us and even have it pass DMARC and DKIM checks if they bought that domain? (last o being a ơ [ơ])
I wrote that fake address, I know where the defect is, and I can't spot the difference on my screen right now. It just looks like the other 50 specks of dirt on my laptop screen.
- egwynn 8y agoOne common way to defend against a partial (or full) homograph attack is to have clients render IDNs as punycode. The downside is that it kinda pulls the plug on non-ascii domains. :-\
- nine_k 8y agoIt has a reasonable workaround: check that all glyphs belong to the same writing system. That is, post.com should have all glyphs from Latin, почта.рф, all glyphs from Cyrillic, and ταχυδρομείο.ελληνικό must have all letters Greek. The fact that the Latin, Cyrillic, and Greek glyphs have same-looking glyphs like o or p is not dangerous if you can't mix them up.
- egwynn 8y agoThat's a cool idea and will normally work, but won't prevent homograph attacks entirely. Identities can still be spoofed if they can be constructed entirely from glyphs in the intersection of two unicode blocks. E.g. `ΝΙΚΕ.ϹΟΜ` and `NIKE.COM`.
- nine_k 8y agoLowercasing them would let the user tell the lowercase L from uppercase i. But I agree, some things may need to be special-cased.
- tomatotomato37 8y agoThat should be preventable if their email clients allow restricting unicode https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/#Restriction_Level_Detection https://www.unicode.org/reports/tr39/#Restriction_Level_Dete...
- jrockway 8y agoYeah, I don't think DMARC helps with that. jon@jrơck.us won't key into the corporate directory, though, so someone should at least think something is amiss. (I thought my screen was dirty.)