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This headline is highly misleading. The article says "Dennis Muilenburg maintained the system was only one factor in a chain of events that led to the disasters
by LeoPanthera 8y ago
This headline is highly misleading. The article says "Dennis Muilenburg maintained the system was only one factor in a chain of events that led to the disasters."
I watched the actual event and this is generally accurate. He maintained that all accidents are a result of a series of events, all of which would have to occur for there to be a crash.
He did not say that MCAS was not at fault - the opposite, in fact, since he said they were testing a new version of MCAS to prevent future crashes.
- noja 8y agoWould the chain of events have been stopped by a functioning MCAS?
- linuxftw 8y agoIf it wasn't for MCAS being present, the chain of events would have never started! It's only there because they cut corners in the first place.
- theclaw 8y agoIf there’s any corner cutting here it’s around AoA sensor redundancy and flight worthiness testing. The reason MCAS is there is that the 737 was too low to the ground to fit newer, bigger, more fuel-efficient engines under the wing, which is what Boeing’s customers wanted, so they had to move the engines forward and compensate for the resulting handling effects in software. Without some form of MCAS there would be no 737-MAX at all, and it’s not fair to say that the whole plane was a corner cutting exercise either, it was an attempt to improve an older, proven design driven by customer demand.
- CaptainZapp 8y agoWithout some form of MCAS there would be no 737-MAX at all, and it’s not fair to say that the whole plane was a corner cutting exercise either, it was an attempt to improve an older, proven design driven by customer demand. I would argue that they applied a software kludge on a design, which is basically no more fit to fly in such a configuration. They did that because Airbus' 320 NEO put them into full throttle panic mode. Espeically since American, a lifelong Boeing customer, considered a pretty big order with Airbus. So, instead of a completely new clean-sheet design (which they considered) they rushed a plane to market, which needed to be fixed with software because it's inherently not fit to fly without such fixes and slapped a 737 sticker onto the plane because of competitive advantage. The obviously dodgy shenanigans applied in the certification process also don't really help.
- jfk13 8y agoHe said the MCAS system met its "design and certification criteria". Yet a couple of paragraphs later, we read that "a report suggested that the system malfunctioned, and forced the plane's nose down more than 20 times before it plummeted into the sea." Is that what it was designed and certified to do? Ouch.
- peeters 8y agoBasically the equivalent of a programmer saying "garbage in, garbage out". He's saying MCAS chews on the AoA sensor, and the AoA sensor was malfunctioning (therefore shifting the blame to the user, who is responsible for maintenance). But failing to mention that Boeing had a role to play in those links of the chain too, first in using only one of the AoA sensors and not having the disagree alert work, and two in that there's a rumor that it's a Boeing problem causing the AoA sensors to become damaged in the first place.
- jfk13 8y agoAlso, isn't there something about the MCAS system originally being certified to make only a fairly limited adjustment to the trim, and subsequently being modified (without re-certifying) to make a much greater adjustment? So it was designed and certified to be able to nudge the nose down a certain amount. Then they changed it to be able to force the nose down much more severely. And it did. Without being an expert, it sure sounds like the Boeing "safety system" is at fault here...
- fredthomsen 8y agoI read the same thing in an article but can't remember exactly where. Why manufacturers should be allowed to certify the safety of certain components of their own airplanes is beyond me.
- cjbprime 8y agoI think the Seattle Times originally broke it: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile... === After the Lion Air Flight 610 crash, Boeing for the first time provided to airlines details about MCAS. Boeing’s bulletin to the airlines stated that the limit of MCAS’s command was 2.5 degrees. That number was new to FAA engineers who had seen 0.6 degrees in the safety assessment. “The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.”
- btown 8y ago"The software wouldn't have crashed if the user didn't click these buttons in a weird order. The bug was only one factor in a chain of events that led to the segfault."
- linuxftw 8y agoUnfortunately, the Ethiopian crash did pretty much everything they were told to do (disable electric stabilizer trim) for the alleged 'memory checklist' procedure and it still wasn't enough. "Crappy sensor failure, crappy software failure, crappy aerodynamic failure" would be the chain of events, because the pilots did everything right.
- theclaw 8y agoNot everyone agrees. There is some argument over why they did not throttle back and ended up overspeeding, which meant they could not manually trim, and why they re-engaged automatic stabiliser trim when the memory items explicitly state not to do so. The throttles were at maximum during the entire episode. My understanding is somewhat limited but I’ve read that the stick shaker activation might have made them leave the throttles alone, and that they may have re-enabled automatic trim because the manual trim wheels were impossible to move at such high velocity. Re-enabling auto trim is what ultimately allowed MCAS to push the nose down for the last time, but it’s not clear to me as a layman whether they could have saved the plane given their situation prior to re-enabling it anyway.
- acqq 8y agoReading a lot of detailed reports, I concluded that nobody at Boeing ever properly tested the conditions that happened by both Lion Air and Ethiopian, until much after the second crash. Boeing didn't do enough steps to reconstruct what happened by Lion Air, otherwise they would have never published totally useless procedure which was then followed by the pilots of Ethiopian. The actual testing in the proper simulator would have shown that the emergency procedure, as written by Boeing after Lion Air crash, just can't work. The pilots in Ethiopian and all the passengers paid with their lives for a whole world to learn that. The world knows because one pilot tried to partially reconstruct the conditions on his own in an older simulator, as there were effectively almost no new simulators because the Boeing's selling point was that the new model of the plane is same as an old one model, just to avoid the recertification and pilot retraining. So the said pilot did the test for youtube, showed that what the pilots probably did matched the emergency procedure, and that exactly that following the procedure most probably results in the crash, but had to remove the video once his employer became aware of what he did. I've posted the link to that original source then, but HN moderators marked it then as a "dupe": https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/03/et302-used-the-cut-out-switches-to-stop-mcas/ https://leehamnews.com/2019/04/03/et302-used-the-cut-out-swi...
- panarky 8y agoHighly disingenuous to infer that if multiple factors that coincide to create a failure, that this component is not "the cause". Of course there are always multiple factors, but all the evidence points to the MCAS system as a major contributor to these catastrophes. I don't know who's advising Boeing on their crisis management and media strategy, but they're doing it wrong. Every time Boeing attempts to sidestep or minimize this it makes me trust them less. Take a lesson from the Tylenol poisonings [0] and the Rogers Commission investigation of the Challenger disaster [1]. Step 1 in enlightened crisis management: accept responsibility. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Tylenol_murders https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Tylenol_murders [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report
- SkyMarshal 8y agoYeah, based on all the info we have so far it appears MCAS was the root cause. Mounting bigger engines higher up and forward changed the plane's center of gravity and made it more likely to go too high AoA under acceleration and stall. MCAS was installed to fix that, but was sloppily implemented, misinterpreted AoA sensor data under some conditions, and was not pilot-overide-able. Major fuckup by Boeing that cost many lives. They've already lost the narrative on this. The CEO's equivocation isn't helping.
- tempguy9999 8y ago> Step 1 in enlightened crisis management: accept responsibility. Agreed completely, but let me be devil's advocate here. If he accepts responsibility then boeing is presumably fully and immediately legally liable. I guess that, particularly under US culture of suing anything that moves, everyone will try to cash in to the maximal extent possible. Including airlines possibly cancelling their existing orders - might they cancel 4,700 plane orders? What would that do to the company? By how much would boeing's liability increase on a straightforward "mea culpa"? I can't agree with his butt-covering but I can see why it's happening. There seems to be little upside to accepting the blame. Could it destroy boeing? How many jobs lost? "Boeing employs more than 153,000 people across the United States and in more than 65 countries" <https://www.boeing.com/company/general-info/> https://www.boeing.com/company/general-info/> and a whole long-tail of US jobs indirectly. How would it affect the US economy and standing in the world (I mean, more than it's already doing now)? I'm sure he's being leant on from above. etc. (please note I'm presenting a possible explanation, not endorsing it. There seems no moral way out of this. The real cause is the historical stupidity that allowed this to occur, for which he should definitely swing, and a few more suits. I am NOT endorsing these things I wrote but they seem things he will have considered. NB am a brit so I'm looking at this from the outside).
- bgirard 8y ago> He maintained that all accidents are a result of a series of events, all of which would have to occur for there to be a crash. That statement is a truism to deflect blame. He also blamed the pilots for not following the checklist.
- Someone1234 8y agoThey followed Boeing's checklist in one of the two, and still crashed. Boeing's checklist doesn't account for high aerodynamic loads on the horizontal stabilizer making manual trim adjustment difficult to impractical. Ethiopian is an interesting crash because they followed Boeing's procedure, were still in imminent danger, and then had to diverge from procedure (i.e. re-enable electronic trim to electronic adjust) but that only worsened the problem since MCAS's five second delay had elapsed. I'd hope we're well passed blaming pilots for this one. Even Lion Air's maintenance team might deserve a little slack, as the MCAS system kept on switching between faulty AoA sensor and working one every time the aircraft was restarted, meaning the maintenance team might not have been able to reproduce the issue.
- bgirard 8y agoI'm well aware. Because of the reasons you state, I was surprised that he mentioned this again in the video.
- kayfox 8y ago>> They followed Boeing's checklist in one of the two, and still crashed. They did not follow it completely, the last item is to leave the cutout switches in cutout, which they did not. They cut the electric trim back in and inexplicably did not correct the trim or further manage it. I suspect that Crew Resource Management was not effective at that point and both pilots were distracted.
- Someone1234 8y agoYou didn't read the post you replied to. The pilots being forced to diverge (and why) in order to recover the aircraft was discussed. > They cut the electric trim back in and inexplicably did not correct the trim or further manage it. That's incorrect. They did in fact apply manual trim adjustments after the trim cutout were reset (see the graph on page 26, specifically the TRIM UP-MAN). > I suspect that Crew Resource Management was not effective at that point and both pilots were distracted. And I suspect you haven't read enough about this topic (or half read it like the post you're replying to) and are jumping to unfounded conclusions.
- bookofjoe 8y agoAccording to the classic book "Normal Accidents" by Charles Perrow, "tight coupling" of events in a chain is invariably the critical factor.
- CaptainZapp 8y agoWell, From [1] : Boeing CEO says 737 Max was designed properly and pilots did not 'completely' follow procedure So he still can't resist smearing the pilots, despite the facts coming to light until now. In my book Boeing changed into the epitome of an evil company, putting profits vastly before safety of their (end) customers. I would be very, very reluctant to set foot into this murder machine. Despite the additional software kludges they try to apply. Kludges onto a 50 year old designe rendered aerodynamically unstable by bigger and diffferent positioned engines. [1] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/29/investing/boeing-annual-meeting/index.html https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/29/investing/boeing-annual-m... (warning! auto-play video)