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As much as I think that Boeing took the wrong decision when going for the MAX instead of replacing the 737 from ground up and that the way the MCAS was develope
by _ph_ 8y ago
As much as I think that Boeing took the wrong decision when going for the MAX instead of replacing the 737 from ground up and that the way the MCAS was developed and put into operations was a big disaster, both from Boeing and the FAA, as much do I disagree with that article.
First of all, while most public know evidence points at MCAS as the source for the crashes, the accident investigations have not concluded yet. The article doesn't even mention that. But, with all what we know so far, Boeing has good reasons to significantly overwork the MCAS software and is doing so.
I am not an aviation expert, but from all I have heard about the 737 MAX (from actual pilots), it looks like the airplane itself is not the issue, it was the specific faults in the MCAS implementation and that the pilots were not properly trained on the aircraft. Beyond fixing the obvious issues with the MCAS implementation, the biggest item for bringing the 737 MAX back into business needs to be pilot training. Training both how to fly the machine with MCAS deactivated as well as dealing with the potential failure szenarios of the MCAS system.
Of course, the whole certification process for the 737 MAX needs to be reviewed to guarantee that the machine has the level of airworthyness one would expect. This is probably the most time-consuming step on the way to restoring its flight-status, but the most necessary one.
Assuming that the 737 MAX after a significant update to the MCAS system passes a proper certification, in contrast to the article I would strongly argue for it to return into service. As much as we know for now, the machine isn't inherently unsafe to fly. But a cancellation could have drastic effects on air travel safety. Boeing decided against a new design in 2011 because of time constraints, and it is now 8 years later. A proper replacement for the 737 MAX wouldn't be ready for many years, probably only at the end of the next decade. If you are worried about safety, you certainly don't want Boeing to rush the development of a new design. Also, there would be little alternatives for replacement. Airbus could increase its output, but that also bears risk of general safety. As does flying the machines, the 737 MAX was meant to replace for more years.
So, unless other issues with the 737 MAX are found in review, it definitely should be put back into business.
- GiuseppaAcciaio 8y agoTaking your argument a bit farther: let's assume that indeed the only issue present is a faulty MCAS implementation and that gets fixed. If the aircraft comes with additional training and certification requirements for pilots before it can be safely operated, then arguably it cannot be lumped into the same type rating as the 737NG. This would destroy the main selling point for Boeing (training pilots for a different type rating is a massive expense and headache for airlines), and would also mean that across the world there would be no pilots allowed to fly the existing 737MAX. The point about not cancelling the 737MAX because of the risk that the new models developed would be rushed and unsafe due to Boeing rushing the development of a new design is... not very plausible I'm afraid.
- _ph_ 8y agoYou misunderstood me. Yes, I think that at least more training/certification of the pilots for the 737 MAX is needed. My argument was, that after fixing MCAS and proper recertifying the 737 MAX there is no fundamental reason not to put it back into business. And that not putting it back into business also carries some safety risks. I never claimed that it should be put back into business because of that. But Nader didn't present a fundamental reason why the machine would be unsafe and completely ignored the consequences of permanentely grounding the 737 MAX.