4 ms·
Out of sight but not invisible: Defeating fileless malware
- lisk1 8y agoAs don't mind this type of articles informative and thorough, the excess use of "Windows Defender ATP" makes me think they are trying to put suggestion in the readers mind. Can we count how many times "Windows Defender ATP" is used?
- jmartinpetersen 8y ago37. That maybe seems a bit heavy. Edit: 38 with the image link at the bottom.
- basetop 8y agoI count 45 if we include variations like "Windows Defender AV", "Windows Defender Security Center", etc. Example from article : "Windows Defender ATP alert showing how detection of the Sharpshooter technique by Windows Defender AV is surfaced in Windows Defender Security Center" And that's not including the text embedded in the images themselves - like the image of the event log ( Event 1127 - Windows Defender ). You can't scroll through the article without a mention of Windows Defender. I don't know if they did it purposefully or not, but I'd say it was intentional. Hard to believe it was accidental.
- 13of40 8y agoI think they have to specify "Windows Defender ATP" because "ATP" is overloaded. There's also "Microsoft Office 365 ATP".
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- staticassertion 8y agoThere's a lot of discussion of behavior based detections, but then it seems to lean heavily on AMSI, which is just an in-memory signature system. Even the syscall monitoring, I wonder if it's really "Given a known sequence of suspicious syscalls" as opposed to "Given a known sequence of good syscalls" eg: signatures vs baselining. Or "These syscalls semantically amount to this behavior". From what I have seen of AMSI it's not much harder than classic AV to bypass. I appreciate the Fileless classifications - that seems like a larger value add, but I'd love to see us also better define TTP and Behavior based detections. It implies that we are observing generalized behaviors as suspicious when in reality it's almost always some sort of combination of predefined signatures. It is not a "behavior" (in a meaningful way) when an attacker uses specific parameters on powershell or some LOLBAS executable, it's just a very specific technique, which is subject to change. The higher level "Got a process to execute and do a thing" is what the behavior is, to me, and what we should detect. To be fair LOLBAS and Fileless are still uncommon approaches for malware, so it is not surprising that it's taking time to hammer out how we should be building out our view of the issue. Still, ATP is a great product, not trying to be overly negative. I think Microsoft is in a really good position to start hammering out the definitions for some of these concepts. I'll give this article another read I'm sure.
- codedokode 8y agoAMSI, as I understand, is a way for an interpreter to cooperate with an antivirus and send code for a check. This means that if you have non-Microsoft interpreter, for example, Java or Python, then AMSI won't work (memory scanning could help though). But what I didn't understand is why Microsoft allows users to run random JS code from Internet with full privileges. Why would anyone need to do this? This looks like a usecase made specifically for malware. If they didn't allow this, there would be no need for AMSI in the first place. If you look at Android, there is no need for techologies like AMSI, because users cannot download and run scripts. And all applications are sandboxed and are run with minimal pivileges. Windows architecture was made for airgapped corporate environments of 80s, where there were no malware and it doesn't work in the modern era. I wanted to write that there is no need for an antivirus on Android, but this is not true. As there are many malicious apps in Google Play and on the Internet, and users don't really understand the permission system, an antivirus that can detect malicious applications, is useful.
- FreakLegion 8y ago> what I didn't understand is why Microsoft allows users to run random JS code from Internet with full privileges The short version is they don't. Cscript and wscript are akin to PowerShell and they aren't talking about JS from the Web. The way it works is, say, the attacker sends the script (direct) as an email attachment and tricks the target into running it, or sends a document (indirect) that drops and runs the script, and tricks the target into opening that. They've even taken to having executables drop and run scripts to offload malicious activity into otherwise trusted processes without setting off alarms, like injection does. In the indirect cases, cscript/wscript aren't the only options for JS. You can also: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";new%20ActiveXObject('Shell.Application').ShellExecute('calc.exe'); But Microsoft is overstating the difficulty of detecting these attacks. For example obfuscation isn't a barrier to detection; in fact obfuscation can itself be detected and is a fantastic signal for blocking this stuff. General Windows system behavior, on the other hand, is chaotic[1], so in practice you're limited to writing rules for e.g. what child processes winword.exe isn't allowed to create, but even then you'll need exemptions for certain teams. 1. uTorrent for example creates child processes in a way that's practically indistinguishable from malware: C:\WINDOWS\System32\mshta.exe C:\WINDOWS\System32\mshta.exe" "C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\HYD4.tmp.1548293039\HTA\index.hta?utorrent" "C:\5ee283553c4ab530c77f19785f6092cabfd8e48a5eefd808cb53aecea4399dd9" /LOG "C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\HYD4.tmp.1548293039\index.hta.log" /PID "1076" /CID "sDbhVc2tIx6wzwCd" /VERSION "111849449" /BUCKET "0" /SSB "1" /COUNTRY "US" /OS "5.1" /BROWSERS "\"C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe\"" /USERTYPE "admin" /ARCHITECTURE "32" /LANG "en" /USERNAME "<USER>" /CLIENT "utorrent"" C:\WINDOWS\system32\cscript.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\cscript.exe" "shell_scripts/check_if_cscript_is_working.js"" C:\WINDOWS\system32\cscript.exe C:\WINDOWS\system32\cscript.exe" shell_scripts/shell_ping_after_close.js "http://i-50.b-000.XYZ.bench.utorrent.com/e?i=50&e=eyJldmVudE5hbWUiOiJoeWRyYTEiLCJhY3Rpb24iOiJmYWlsR2VuZXJhbCIsInR5cGUiOiJpIiwiZXJyb3IiOiJFcnJvcjogVW5hYmxlIHRvIHdhaXQgZm9yIHByb2Nlc3MuOyBmaWxlOiBmaWxlOi8vLmpzOyBsaW5lOiAxMCJ9" "