4 ms·

I envisage a system where a few dozen independent organisations around the World run the root. They all have the same data. If any of them modify their local co

I envisage a system where a few dozen independent organisations around the World run the root. They all have the same data. If any of them modify their local copy of the data or try to poison the distributed data, their trusted status is revoked. Child DNS resolvers should be able to detect new trusted organisations and remove untrusted organisations quickly. This could all be handled through public key encryption and automatic voting. DNSSEC or similar should be complete and enforced for all zones and lookups. You would need to compromise over half of the trusted organisations running the root in order to break this system.

mike-cardwell 16y ago
There could even be a constitution and perhaps some sort of contractual obligation to not modify the data with agreed legal consequences...?
rmc 16y ago
I envisage a system where a few dozen independent organisations around the World run the root. They all have the same data. If any of them modify their local copy of the data or try to poison the distributed data, their trusted status is revoked. So what happens if someone attacks/compromises more than half of these trusted nodes at once with bad data? Is the bad data then the good data
- mike-cardwell 16y ago
  Yes... Of course... But if something like that did happen, the organisations would be able to roll back the data as long as more than half of them agreed. If public key cryptography were used, then you could make it so that only change requests signed with the domain owners private key are accepted and distributed too.
- mike-cardwell 16y ago
  If there are 35 trusted organisations and governments around the World colluded to take over the network by taking over 18 of these organisations and getting them to "untrust" the other 17, then this would splinter the network, and people around the World would need to manually repoint their resolvers at the other group of 17. This system relies on the fact that it is difficult to take down lots of independent organisations that are spread around the World at the same time easily.

mike-cardwell 16y ago

There could even be a constitution and perhaps some sort of contractual obligation to not modify the data with agreed legal consequences...?

rmc 16y ago

I envisage a system where a few dozen independent organisations around the World run the root. They all have the same data. If any of them modify their local copy of the data or try to poison the distributed data, their trusted status is revoked. So what happens if someone attacks/compromises more than half of these trusted nodes at once with bad data? Is the bad data then the good data

mike-cardwell 16y ago
Yes... Of course... But if something like that did happen, the organisations would be able to roll back the data as long as more than half of them agreed. If public key cryptography were used, then you could make it so that only change requests signed with the domain owners private key are accepted and distributed too.
mike-cardwell 16y ago
If there are 35 trusted organisations and governments around the World colluded to take over the network by taking over 18 of these organisations and getting them to "untrust" the other 17, then this would splinter the network, and people around the World would need to manually repoint their resolvers at the other group of 17. This system relies on the fact that it is difficult to take down lots of independent organisations that are spread around the World at the same time easily.