4 ms·

Many Worlds still owes us an explanation of the apparently huge difference between this, the actual, world and all the other apparently not quite so actual ones

Many Worlds still owes us an explanation of the apparently huge difference between this, the actual, world and all the other apparently not quite so actual ones, does it not? The two most promising ideas (IMO) are the idea that the "wave function collapse" is a non-physical event describing a change in our knowledge, the quantum informatics approach as per Philip Ball's recent RI lecture,[1] and the "Relational" interpretation[2] which observes that a measurement always entangles the measuring system with the measured system, and is best treated as such - i.e. as an entanglement relationship; though it seems that this leads to an "entanglements all the way down" view in which these relationships are the ultimate physical reality, rather than the conventional picture of the relationships being secondary to the things which are so related. The "measurement as entanglement" view is, I know, notably supported by at least one HN poster[3], who I hope will be on hand to correct my no-doubt erroneous rendition :) 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q7v5NtV8v6I https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q7v5NtV8v6I 2: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_quantum_mechanics https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_quantum_mechanics 3: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12657447 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12657447

btilly 8y ago
Many Worlds still owes us an explanation of the apparently huge difference between this, the actual, world and all the other apparently not quite so actual ones, does it not? No. For a start, there is no evidence that the ones you are calling "not quite so actual" are any less actual than the one we share an experience of. Continuing on, the interpretation does not attempt to explain the phenomena of perceived consciousness. That is as much out of its remit as abiogenesis is out of the remit of Darwin's theory of evolution. Those problems are different in kind, much harder, and have to be addressed by very different theories. Everett addressed a precise problem. That problem is explaining why, to the extent that QM describes an observer, the act of observation must turn that observer into a superposition of observers. Each of which has observed an apparent collapse, and none of which can interact further in any meaningful way.
- ttctciyf 8y ago
  > For a start, there is no evidence that the ones you are calling "not quite so actual" are any less actual than the one we share an experience of. Well, there is evidence of the one I'm calling "actual" - if it's evidence you want, there's no evidence at all of the "not so actual" ones - citing the MW interpretation as evidence of these is purely circular. Regards not explaining perceived consciousness.. If MW is shunting off questions of actuality into something to be resolved by a theory of consciousness isn't it leaving behind centuries of consensus belief in the objective observer-independent existence of a physical world ontologically prior to consciousness?

btilly 8y ago

Many Worlds still owes us an explanation of the apparently huge difference between this, the actual, world and all the other apparently not quite so actual ones, does it not? No. For a start, there is no evidence that the ones you are calling "not quite so actual" are any less actual than the one we share an experience of. Continuing on, the interpretation does not attempt to explain the phenomena of perceived consciousness. That is as much out of its remit as abiogenesis is out of the remit of Darwin's theory of evolution. Those problems are different in kind, much harder, and have to be addressed by very different theories. Everett addressed a precise problem. That problem is explaining why, to the extent that QM describes an observer, the act of observation must turn that observer into a superposition of observers. Each of which has observed an apparent collapse, and none of which can interact further in any meaningful way.

ttctciyf 8y ago
> For a start, there is no evidence that the ones you are calling "not quite so actual" are any less actual than the one we share an experience of. Well, there is evidence of the one I'm calling "actual" - if it's evidence you want, there's no evidence at all of the "not so actual" ones - citing the MW interpretation as evidence of these is purely circular. Regards not explaining perceived consciousness.. If MW is shunting off questions of actuality into something to be resolved by a theory of consciousness isn't it leaving behind centuries of consensus belief in the objective observer-independent existence of a physical world ontologically prior to consciousness?