4 ms·

You watched the VOX video and are reposting the summery here? They are going to fix the software with no changes to the design. They don't need to change the

You watched the VOX video and are reposting the summery here? They are going to fix the software with no changes to the design. They don't need to change the design, that would be expensive overkill. Software updates are as close as we can get to Free. There is not a single company or human with infinite money to spend on anything, we can't always have the fantasy.

kakwa_ 7y ago
The MAX can be fixed by addressing the flaws in MCAS, and it will be in the end. The production will resume, the MAX will be a slightly less commercial success than it should have been, Boeing will be fined a few Billions for its failings, the FAA will have to take an hard look at itself, and everything will be ok. I just hope the correct conclusions will be learnt from this crash: * have a truly independent certification process * don't fix your physical design issues with software * don't write and maintain software running on an airplane like the software from the start-up world: significant design flaws are not tolerable for software running in an airplane, even if they can be fixed easily. * don't hide new systems, if there is a new system, then pilot should be trained by the way, it's not the first time a new system caught pilot by surprised because they didn't knew about it. SAS Flight 751 is another example, ice ingestion damaged the engines, the pilots reduced the thrust to reduce stress, but an automatic system (ATR, Automatic Thrust Restoration), unknown to the pilots, put the thrust back to full power, disintegrating the engines, the plane fortunately crash landed without fatalities thanks to the pilots skills and a bit of luck. * Boeing should really think about replacing the 737, the old design is putting too much constraints, preventing a clean design.
- blackflame7000 7y ago
  Its not very easy to redesign the 737. Bigger Engines need more clearance. More clearance requires longer landing gear. Longer landing gear requires a wider plane to fold up into. A wider plane is less fuel efficient and needs bigger engines and suddenly you are a 757,767,787, or 777
  - pm24601 7y ago
    > Its not very easy to redesign the 737. Too bad. I know I am now permanently reluctant to fly 737s
    - blackflame7000 7y ago
      You really shouldn't be. There is a lot of misconception going around that the 737 is inherently unstable. This is not true. The 737-600/700/800/900 was one of the safest designs ever built (http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm). Yet of the few crashes it had, a surprising amount was from pilot disorientation causing them to accidentally stall the plane. MCAS is not a feature to correct an unstable aircraft, it's to correct a confused pilot. MCAS is triggered if the following circumstances are right: 1) The airspeed is near stalling speed (takeoffs and landings) 2) The AOA (as reported by both sensors now) is greater than the aircraft can climb. The problem was that 1) the AOA data was faulty, 2) it did not check if there was a disagreement with the backup system 3) The aircraft failed to reset each time it took corrective measures such that each the correction was compounded. 4) the corrective action was 3 times more than approved. All of these things have been fixed but it also shows how many things have to go wrong for something to be catastrophic. But the max has been built on a solid foundation and that's much better than having to start from scratch.

kakwa_ 7y ago

The MAX can be fixed by addressing the flaws in MCAS, and it will be in the end. The production will resume, the MAX will be a slightly less commercial success than it should have been, Boeing will be fined a few Billions for its failings, the FAA will have to take an hard look at itself, and everything will be ok. I just hope the correct conclusions will be learnt from this crash: * have a truly independent certification process * don't fix your physical design issues with software * don't write and maintain software running on an airplane like the software from the start-up world: significant design flaws are not tolerable for software running in an airplane, even if they can be fixed easily. * don't hide new systems, if there is a new system, then pilot should be trained by the way, it's not the first time a new system caught pilot by surprised because they didn't knew about it. SAS Flight 751 is another example, ice ingestion damaged the engines, the pilots reduced the thrust to reduce stress, but an automatic system (ATR, Automatic Thrust Restoration), unknown to the pilots, put the thrust back to full power, disintegrating the engines, the plane fortunately crash landed without fatalities thanks to the pilots skills and a bit of luck. * Boeing should really think about replacing the 737, the old design is putting too much constraints, preventing a clean design.

blackflame7000 7y ago
Its not very easy to redesign the 737. Bigger Engines need more clearance. More clearance requires longer landing gear. Longer landing gear requires a wider plane to fold up into. A wider plane is less fuel efficient and needs bigger engines and suddenly you are a 757,767,787, or 777
- pm24601 7y ago
  > Its not very easy to redesign the 737. Too bad. I know I am now permanently reluctant to fly 737s
  - blackflame7000 7y ago
    You really shouldn't be. There is a lot of misconception going around that the 737 is inherently unstable. This is not true. The 737-600/700/800/900 was one of the safest designs ever built (http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm). Yet of the few crashes it had, a surprising amount was from pilot disorientation causing them to accidentally stall the plane. MCAS is not a feature to correct an unstable aircraft, it's to correct a confused pilot. MCAS is triggered if the following circumstances are right: 1) The airspeed is near stalling speed (takeoffs and landings) 2) The AOA (as reported by both sensors now) is greater than the aircraft can climb. The problem was that 1) the AOA data was faulty, 2) it did not check if there was a disagreement with the backup system 3) The aircraft failed to reset each time it took corrective measures such that each the correction was compounded. 4) the corrective action was 3 times more than approved. All of these things have been fixed but it also shows how many things have to go wrong for something to be catastrophic. But the max has been built on a solid foundation and that's much better than having to start from scratch.