4 ms·
It's not the logic that's the problem as much as the fact that the systems are meant to work with clean data, and the fact that data could not just be missing,
by Raidion 8y ago
It's not the logic that's the problem as much as the fact that the systems are meant to work with clean data, and the fact that data could not just be missing, but straight up incorrect was never considered as a valid possibility. This was made worse by the fact that the poorly formulated "solution" was barely communicated to the pilots. I saw somewhere that the plane could be unrecoverable in 40 seconds. You need to have bigger safety margins than that.
- ncmncm 8y ago40 seconds is an eternity to a pilot taking off or landing. Even Air France, taken down by a plugged pitot tube from cruise altitude, was doomed after only two minutes. Airbus has a lot to answer for on that one: averaging inputs from the pilot's and copilot's game controllers? Game controllers? Turning off the stall warning in deep stall, so that starting to recover sounds it again? Failing to teach pilots what stalls are, what they feel like, and how to prevent and recover from them? There is more than enough blame to go around for that one. The Boeing software, like the Airbus's, apparently performed as specified, so there was no problem with execution of the spec. The problem was that it was a bad spec, in too many ways to count.