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> What indicates to you that your definition of 'definition' isn't an arbitrary assignment of semantics to symbols, with semantics that don't in any way connect

> What indicates to you that your definition of 'definition' isn't an arbitrary assignment of semantics to symbols, with semantics that don't in any way connect to reality? Nothing does, because that is exactly what it is? But mind you that that does not mean that whether there is a consensus on this definition is not a question of reality. Just because definitions are arbitrary, doesn't mean that you can't get together with other people and agree on a common definition, to make it useful for communication, nor that you can't empirically determine whether such an agreement exists. > To rephrase, are you saying "a claim depends on something that is not just a matter of definition when evaluated using only definitions and there are remaining unresolved references"? Well, yeah? > What is your definition of "true"? Either consistent with reality or derived from axioms. > If "To be in accordance with reality implies being true", then I can replace "in accordance with reality" with "true" in a sentence. If "To be a rat implies being a mammal", then I can replace "a rat" with "a mammal" in a sentence. "'To be a mammal is being a rat' is not something I would agree with" then becomes "'To be a rat is being a rat' is not something I would agree with". So, all mammals are rats then? (In other words: No, you can't?) > When you say "we also use the word 'true' to refer to statements derived from formal systems", would I be correct in saying that something is 'true' under a formal system, when it is consistent with that system? I guess it depends on what exactly you mean by "consistent". A statement where neither that statement nor its negation can be derived/proven from a given formal system arguably can be considered consistent with that formal system (i.e., not inconsistent), in which case that implication isn't true. > In other words yet again (regarding my above statement indicating that we may need a word or adjective to separate how we speak of truth): is the statement "It is true that '1 + 9 = 10' is consistent with the Peano axioms" 'formally true' or 'really true'? That is 'formally true', I guess, though the statement is potentially ambiguous, because: Ultimately, behind every abstraction of a formal system that we have encountered so far, there is some physical evaluator or group of evaluators, and whether some proof is accepted as correct or not is ultimately decided by those evaluators/by a consensus of those evaluators. So, in that sense, every 'formal truth' is a 'real truth' about evaluators in the world, and whether they agree on the evaluation result, in much the same way that every (arbitrary) definition is a 'real truth' about definers in the world, and whether they agree on a definition. > Another question that I think is pertinent to our conversation regarding '1 + 9 = 10': What is a number? How about 'a more abstract word'? (Plus, I guess, it needs to be usable for measuring and/or counting?) > If math didn't exist absent a physical/material medium, then could you observe it? If so, then wouldn't all math be a reality, if not, then why consider it not able to exist absent a physical medium? Perhaps this is another case of confusing abstraction and the underlying representation, in which case, what is abstraction and how can it be represented in different ways but also be dependent on its representation? That seems like another case of just that confusion, yeah. Consider a hallucinating human. A hallucinating human has ideas that aren't real, right? But yet those ideas are real. That is to say: A hallucinating human is really hallucinating, hallucination is a somewhat physically observable phenomenon. But what they are thinking is not in any way a sensible model of reality, hence not real. 'Real' is used with two different meanings here, and conflating the two is fallacious equivocation. And in the same way, mathematicians can be observed doing math. But that doesn't mean that the math that they are doing is in any way a model of reality. The existence of a thought and the content of that thought are two distinct things. Also, it is not dependent on its representation, it is dependent on a representation. You can not have a movie without representation. That doesn't mean that a movie must be a DVD. The movie is still the same movie when it is photons coming out of a projector. But it is not a(n existing) movie anymore when you destroy all representations of it. > This seems to fly in the face of you stating "[...]" In which way? > Are you, summed together with the context of other things you've stated, saying: definitions and rules are non-physical, but there is no reason to think that there exists anything besides the representations of things, and all representations are physical? No, I don't think so. For one, there is reason to think that things that are not (just) representations do exist, like, say, a rock (unless you count everything as a representation of itself, then I guess that's true by definition, but there is still a distinction between self-representation and "other-representation"). And also, I am not saying that all representations are physical, just that no non-physical representation has ever been demonstrated, and thus there is no reason to believe that that's a thing (yet). > I analogized "1 < 2" being true or false regardless of its symbolic or conceptual representation That simply seems to be a category error, which is the reason why I can't see a referent. '1 < 2' is an expression that can be evaluated using some formal system. Like, there are rules for transforming '1 < 2' into 'true'. You seem to be assuming that there is something left that '1 < 2' could refer to after you have removed the evaluation rules, but I don't see what that could be. > to "There is a diamond on the moon" being true or false regardless of its symbolic or conceptual representation. You stated that a 'closer analogy would be about "a diamond on the moon", with "the moon" having no referent' because the objects in my diamond-moon analogy have physical presence and "1 < 2" does not. '1 < 2' having a physical presence was not a requirement on my part. Not that I have any clue what a non-physical presence would look like, but that isn't my problem, because you are the one making the claim that there is such a thing, so it is up to you to demonstrate that. > If you are "simply pointing out that there is no truth value if there is no referent" and not saying that "'1 < 2' has no referent", then you haven't challenged my analogy because you've only asserted "if". That is actually a perfectly valid challenge, namely pointing out an unjustified assumption? Your argument builds on there being a truth value, and I have pointed out that you have not established that there is a truth value (because that is dependent on '1 < 2' having a referent, which you have not demonstrated), hence your argument fails, and it is now up to you to show that there is in fact a referent (and thus a truth value) if you want to continue using that argument, or to use a different argument, or to take back your claim. > What, then, constitutes an instance of an axiom that is analogous to an instance of a movie? I think I don't understand what you are asking. > The potential for the universe being in a different state does not effect anything. Doesn't it effect, you know, the universe changig its state? Or is that simply a matter of naming? What if we called "the potential for the universe being in a different state" a "unichangetron" instead? A unichangetron is the mechanism that changes the state of the universe, much like an electron is a mechanism that changes the state of the electric field. Is the unichangetron a part of physical reality? > Not necessarily. Morality is a topic. You can care about what someone has to say about morality without being convince of what they are saying. This conversation is an example. You care enough about what I have to say to continue asking what I have to say about morality, but, unless you've been holding out on me ;), you're obviously not convinced that what I am saying is true. That's all true, but also completely besides the point? The question wasn't why I should care about what you have to say (i.e., why I should listen to what you say), but why I should care about morality under the definition you gave (i.e., why I should use that version of morality for anything). > After caring about what I) had to say, you would only act toward following what I am saying regarding morality if you were convinced what I was saying was true. Well, yeah. Which is why I am asking you to justify your assertions, so I can check whether your justifications are convincing. So far, as far as morality is concerned, there have been no justifications, only assertions, and obviously I am not going to be convinced by pure assertions that I wasn't convinced of before. So, if your goal is to convince, you have so far failed to present anything that would even fall into the category of "potentially convincing". >> If you cared to attain maximum wealth, and you believed that maximum wealth could be attained through shooting yourself in the head, then shooting yourself in the head would be the way to go. >> Do you agree? > Absolutely. So, are you saying that if you believe that shooting yourself in the head will make you attain maximum wealth, and you then shoot yourself in the head, you will indeed attain maximum wealth?

sonusario 8y ago
> Nothing does, because that is exactly what it is? So, we can only agree or disagree, and there is no reason to believe your definition of 'definition'? > Just because definitions are arbitrary, doesn't mean that you can't get together with other people and agree on a common definition, to make it useful for communication, nor that you can't empirically determine whether such an agreement exists. How might we empirically determine whether such agreements exist without having agreement on what the term 'agree' means? > Well, yeah? How do you determine that there are actual unresolved references, and that it is not just a deficiency in your definitions? ================================================================================ > Either consistent with reality or derived from axioms. Why is that your definition of "true"? Also what are your definitions of "consistent" and "derived"? ================================================================================ > ... (In other words: No, you can't?) Agreed. ================================================================================ > So, in that sense, every 'formal truth' is a 'real truth' about evaluators in the world... You may need to go into more depth for me because this seems to walk back on previous statements you've made. Above you defined "true" as "Either consistent with reality or derived from axioms". It seems that you agree with calling 'consistent with reality' a 'real truth' and 'derived from axioms' a 'formal truth'. Now you've stated that "... every 'formal truth' is a 'real truth' ...". Wouldn't that in some way negate the most of the emphasis provided by the term 'formal truth'? ================================================================================ > How about 'a more abstract word'? A number is 'a more abstract word'?? ================================================================================ > And in the same way, mathematicians can be observed doing math. But that doesn't mean that the math that they are doing is in any way a model of reality. Does that mean that the math isn't a model of reality though? > The existence of a thought and the content of that thought are two distinct things. Does that establish that the content of a thought doesn't really exist though? ================================================================================ > But it is not a(n existing) movie anymore when you destroy all representations of it. Are you making a distinction between a representation and the thing being represented? It seems that your definition of 'representation' also includes the thing being represented, but that is a definition you deny later on when you state "For one, there is reason to think that things that are not (just) representations do exist, like, say, a rock (unless you count everything as a representation of itself, then I guess that's true by definition, but there is still a distinction between self-representation and "other-representation")". >>>> Are definitions and rules of evaluation physical? >>> For definitions: No, the same way that movies aren't physical. >> This seems to fly in the face of you stating "[...]" > In which way? "... the same way that movies aren't physical." and "... all movies we have ever encountered so far had a physical representation.", and now also "But it is not a(n existing) movie anymore when you destroy all representations of it." To paraphrase my understanding of your position: "All movies encountered have had physical representation." K "Definitions are not physical in the same way that movies aren't physical." Contradicts the previous line a bit... "When all representations of a movie are destroyed, that movie no longer exists." Wait, if there are only physical representations of movies, then, even if I'm confusing abstraction and representation, how can movies be non-physical in any way? Again this could be another case of confusing abstraction and the underlying representation, and if that is the case, what is 'abstraction', what does it mean for something to be an abstraction, and do particular abstractions have physical representation? ================================================================================ > And also, I am not saying that all representations are physical, just that no non-physical representation has ever been demonstrated, and thus there is no reason to believe that that's a thing (yet). This back-and-forth between us started off of me having stated "Math is not testable with the scientific method, but it is obviously compatible with science" and you had replied "If you mean that axioms are not testable, that's simply a category error because axioms are not claims about reality." Now, if you're not saying "that all representations are physical", and are saying "that no non-physical representation has ever been demonstrated", wouldn't that, at the very least, leave the question open to axioms being claims about reality? ================================================================================ >> I analogized "1 < 2" being true or false regardless of its symbolic or conceptual representation > That simply seems to be a category error, which is the reason why I can't see a referent. '1 < 2' is an expression that can be evaluated using some formal system. Like, there are rules for transforming '1 < 2' into 'true'. You seem to be assuming that there is something left that '1 < 2' could refer to after you have removed the evaluation rules, but I don't see what that could be. Why are you equating the "symbolic or conceptual representation" of '1 < 2' to the "evaluation rules" of '1 < 2'? > '1 < 2' having a physical presence was not a requirement on my part. Not that I have any clue what a non-physical presence would look like, but that isn't my problem, because you are the one making the claim that there is such a thing, so it is up to you to demonstrate that. I have no qualms with ending our discussion if your taking the middle ground of "I don't know". I could go on, but I really don't care to. You initially challenged my assertion regarding math and science, my claims namely being on the grounds of math not being physical, by claiming that I was making a category error (at the time from my vantage point, you seemed to be saying only the physical exists). My goal has been to bring things to a middle ground, but if you haven't been or are no longer making claims against the non-physical, then we are at where I wanted to be. You can challenge claims of the non-physical, to be sure, but at this juncture I prefer to shoot down claims that assert the non-physical doesn't exist, of which you no longer appear to me to be claiming. >> If you are "simply pointing out that there is no truth value if there is no referent" and not saying that "'1 < 2' has no referent", then you haven't challenged my analogy because you've only asserted "if". > That is actually a perfectly valid challenge, namely pointing out an unjustified assumption? Your argument builds on there being a truth value, and I have pointed out that you have not established that there is a truth value (because that is dependent on '1 < 2' having a referent, which you have not demonstrated), hence your argument fails, and it is now up to you to show that there is in fact a referent (and thus a truth value) if you want to continue using that argument, or to use a different argument, or to take back your claim. Your paragraph here is a valid challenge. Your pointing out of an unjustified assumption was not explicit previously. What makes "'1 < 2' has a referent" an unjustified assumption in the context of my argument? Yes I have not established it, but what would make me unjustified in assuming it? ================================================================================ >>>>> An expression of the form "movies are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of movies. >>>> Would the equivalent statement for axioms therefore say "An expression of the form "axioms are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of axioms"? >>> Sure. >> What, then, constitutes an instance of an axiom that is analogous to an instance of a movie? > I think I don't understand what you are asking. What did you mean by "instances of movies"? ================================================================================ >> The potential for the universe being in a different state does not effect anything. > Doesn't it effect, you know, the universe changing its state? No. The potential for the universe being in a different state is not a mechanism by which the universe changes state. ================================================================================ > ... why I should care about morality under the definition you gave (i.e., why I should use that version of morality for anything). First "care" and "use" are two very different questions. Again, define should ;). Why should you use the version of morality of which I am speaking? Because it is the true one (I recognize that I have not established this). > So, are you saying that if you believe that shooting yourself in the head will make you attain maximum wealth, and you then shoot yourself in the head, you will indeed attain maximum wealth? Absolutely not.

sonusario 8y ago

> Nothing does, because that is exactly what it is? So, we can only agree or disagree, and there is no reason to believe your definition of 'definition'? > Just because definitions are arbitrary, doesn't mean that you can't get together with other people and agree on a common definition, to make it useful for communication, nor that you can't empirically determine whether such an agreement exists. How might we empirically determine whether such agreements exist without having agreement on what the term 'agree' means? > Well, yeah? How do you determine that there are actual unresolved references, and that it is not just a deficiency in your definitions? ================================================================================ > Either consistent with reality or derived from axioms. Why is that your definition of "true"? Also what are your definitions of "consistent" and "derived"? ================================================================================ > ... (In other words: No, you can't?) Agreed. ================================================================================ > So, in that sense, every 'formal truth' is a 'real truth' about evaluators in the world... You may need to go into more depth for me because this seems to walk back on previous statements you've made. Above you defined "true" as "Either consistent with reality or derived from axioms". It seems that you agree with calling 'consistent with reality' a 'real truth' and 'derived from axioms' a 'formal truth'. Now you've stated that "... every 'formal truth' is a 'real truth' ...". Wouldn't that in some way negate the most of the emphasis provided by the term 'formal truth'? ================================================================================ > How about 'a more abstract word'? A number is 'a more abstract word'?? ================================================================================ > And in the same way, mathematicians can be observed doing math. But that doesn't mean that the math that they are doing is in any way a model of reality. Does that mean that the math isn't a model of reality though? > The existence of a thought and the content of that thought are two distinct things. Does that establish that the content of a thought doesn't really exist though? ================================================================================ > But it is not a(n existing) movie anymore when you destroy all representations of it. Are you making a distinction between a representation and the thing being represented? It seems that your definition of 'representation' also includes the thing being represented, but that is a definition you deny later on when you state "For one, there is reason to think that things that are not (just) representations do exist, like, say, a rock (unless you count everything as a representation of itself, then I guess that's true by definition, but there is still a distinction between self-representation and "other-representation")". >>>> Are definitions and rules of evaluation physical? >>> For definitions: No, the same way that movies aren't physical. >> This seems to fly in the face of you stating "[...]" > In which way? "... the same way that movies aren't physical." and "... all movies we have ever encountered so far had a physical representation.", and now also "But it is not a(n existing) movie anymore when you destroy all representations of it." To paraphrase my understanding of your position: "All movies encountered have had physical representation." K "Definitions are not physical in the same way that movies aren't physical." Contradicts the previous line a bit... "When all representations of a movie are destroyed, that movie no longer exists." Wait, if there are only physical representations of movies, then, even if I'm confusing abstraction and representation, how can movies be non-physical in any way? Again this could be another case of confusing abstraction and the underlying representation, and if that is the case, what is 'abstraction', what does it mean for something to be an abstraction, and do particular abstractions have physical representation? ================================================================================ > And also, I am not saying that all representations are physical, just that no non-physical representation has ever been demonstrated, and thus there is no reason to believe that that's a thing (yet). This back-and-forth between us started off of me having stated "Math is not testable with the scientific method, but it is obviously compatible with science" and you had replied "If you mean that axioms are not testable, that's simply a category error because axioms are not claims about reality." Now, if you're not saying "that all representations are physical", and are saying "that no non-physical representation has ever been demonstrated", wouldn't that, at the very least, leave the question open to axioms being claims about reality? ================================================================================ >> I analogized "1 < 2" being true or false regardless of its symbolic or conceptual representation > That simply seems to be a category error, which is the reason why I can't see a referent. '1 < 2' is an expression that can be evaluated using some formal system. Like, there are rules for transforming '1 < 2' into 'true'. You seem to be assuming that there is something left that '1 < 2' could refer to after you have removed the evaluation rules, but I don't see what that could be. Why are you equating the "symbolic or conceptual representation" of '1 < 2' to the "evaluation rules" of '1 < 2'? > '1 < 2' having a physical presence was not a requirement on my part. Not that I have any clue what a non-physical presence would look like, but that isn't my problem, because you are the one making the claim that there is such a thing, so it is up to you to demonstrate that. I have no qualms with ending our discussion if your taking the middle ground of "I don't know". I could go on, but I really don't care to. You initially challenged my assertion regarding math and science, my claims namely being on the grounds of math not being physical, by claiming that I was making a category error (at the time from my vantage point, you seemed to be saying only the physical exists). My goal has been to bring things to a middle ground, but if you haven't been or are no longer making claims against the non-physical, then we are at where I wanted to be. You can challenge claims of the non-physical, to be sure, but at this juncture I prefer to shoot down claims that assert the non-physical doesn't exist, of which you no longer appear to me to be claiming. >> If you are "simply pointing out that there is no truth value if there is no referent" and not saying that "'1 < 2' has no referent", then you haven't challenged my analogy because you've only asserted "if". > That is actually a perfectly valid challenge, namely pointing out an unjustified assumption? Your argument builds on there being a truth value, and I have pointed out that you have not established that there is a truth value (because that is dependent on '1 < 2' having a referent, which you have not demonstrated), hence your argument fails, and it is now up to you to show that there is in fact a referent (and thus a truth value) if you want to continue using that argument, or to use a different argument, or to take back your claim. Your paragraph here is a valid challenge. Your pointing out of an unjustified assumption was not explicit previously. What makes "'1 < 2' has a referent" an unjustified assumption in the context of my argument? Yes I have not established it, but what would make me unjustified in assuming it? ================================================================================ >>>>> An expression of the form "movies are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of movies. >>>> Would the equivalent statement for axioms therefore say "An expression of the form "axioms are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of axioms"? >>> Sure. >> What, then, constitutes an instance of an axiom that is analogous to an instance of a movie? > I think I don't understand what you are asking. What did you mean by "instances of movies"? ================================================================================ >> The potential for the universe being in a different state does not effect anything. > Doesn't it effect, you know, the universe changing its state? No. The potential for the universe being in a different state is not a mechanism by which the universe changes state. ================================================================================ > ... why I should care about morality under the definition you gave (i.e., why I should use that version of morality for anything). First "care" and "use" are two very different questions. Again, define should ;). Why should you use the version of morality of which I am speaking? Because it is the true one (I recognize that I have not established this). > So, are you saying that if you believe that shooting yourself in the head will make you attain maximum wealth, and you then shoot yourself in the head, you will indeed attain maximum wealth? Absolutely not.