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The problem is, even in a situation with only good faith actors, not every codepath is equally developed/tested/working, and bugs creep in. Especially if some p
by pas 8y ago
The problem is, even in a situation with only good faith actors, not every codepath is equally developed/tested/working, and bugs creep in. Especially if some parts of a protocol are there for future use. Then if a buggy implementation gets widespread, that effectively nixes that part of the future potential of the protocol.
That's why, if you think about a clever solution for something, and your solution depends on the letter of the standard instead on actual large scale experiments, then the risk of stumbling into big problems is large. Sure, it might be only 1-5% of the Internet that cannot use your clever solution. But historically developers opted to chose solutions that work for 99.9%, even at the cost of even more layers/encapsulation/complexity.
- mindslight 8y agoDoesn't this line up with my point? What you're saying seems to be most relevant in the context of unaccountable meddle boxes - eg I fully agree if you want your protocol to work widely, you have to accept the current Internet as it is and set ip.proto = {1,6,17}. But to avoid creating even more of these constraints you want to keep as much as possible out of sight of the meddle boxes, lest they get ideas to start doing even more filtering. Given that crypto is now computationally inexpensive, this seems straightforward with anything that is not already in IP/TCP/UDP headers.
- pas 8y agoIt lines up, I just wanted to point out that there needs to be no malicious exploitative intent, this kind of network state degradation naturally follows from the always ongoing optimization of resource allocation by actors involved in the process. And thus there is a natural priority of features when it comes to network equipment design, development, production, testing, marketing, support and eventual replacement. And yes, crypto helps with enforcing the layers, it forces engineers to move to a different part of the solution space when it comes to doing things that used to be done with DPI/snooping/etc. (A lot of the meddleboxes were sort of rational responses, like a MITM caching proxy, DNS hijacking, captive portals, blablabla. And they were quick and dirty.)
- mindslight 8y agoI stand by the characterization of "exploitative". The point of protocols is to mediate between parties with diverging interests. The parties deploying meddle boxes are rationally trying to further their own interests, but they are doing so by stepping over the delineating line. In 2019, the idea that neighborly courtesy would preserve the line was obviously naive. Now we need to build concrete walls. And lest you think that my viewpoint is completely at odds with network administrators - elsewhere I've argued that raw unrestricted IP access will eventually come to be seen as a bug. Surveillance companies backhaul much of their collect unhindered precisely because "Internet access" is given as an all-or-nothing condition. IP is actually horrible for addressing such concerns, which is why attempts at egress firewalls devolve into idiotic "block everything but 80/443" (and then new devices respond by working over HTTPS). I think in the future, if we're lucky, the equivalent of firewalls will be based around type systems over PDUs, and embedded devices will be forced to specify exactly what they communicate. But those capabilities need to be kept at personal network edges (or even per-user) by devices' owners making them transparent (akin to installing a personal CA), with traffic over the centrally-controlled transit network remaining completely opaque.