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> The FBI asked Apple to put a build on a phone that would allow them to brute force the passcode, leaving the device and the build on Apple's premises the enti

by urda 7y ago

> The FBI asked Apple to put a build on a phone that would allow them to brute force the passcode, leaving the device and the build on Apple's premises the entire time. It doesn't matter how well it might be locked down or secured. If the government coerced them into building it, it wouldn't be difficult to go one more step and require apple to hand over the modified OS. This [1] does a great job of explaining why building a master key is just a bad idea. This is a pandora's box we do not need to open. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPBH1eW28mo https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPBH1eW28mo

lern_too_spel 7y ago
The master key already exists. It is the key used to sign builds. Edit: downvotes of easily verifiable facts are causing hn to block me from responding. At the time Apple made the false marketing claims, no passcode was required to install a signed build. Hence, the FBI's request. The FBI was asking for no more than what Apple could already do, and it was letting Apple control the whole process. The problem was that what Apple could already do disagreed with what Apple told its customers that it could do.
- Lownin 7y ago
  Except in the case that the device will not accept the build without the user's passcode, right?
  - zaroth 7y ago
    Correct. This may not have been perfectly locked down before the secure element, but Apple’s design goal has always been that the device hardware prevents even Apple itself from retrieving encrypted data without the passcode, and that passcode should have a strictly limited number of attempts to guess. Bugs will always be found and it’s a mistake to think even the latest iPhone is immune to attack. In particular, the baseband continues to be a large attack surface, and IMO is the vector most likely used by the Saudis to remotely access iPhones on their cellular network. I’d feel safer if a powered off iPhone did not connect to any network (WiFi, Cell, or USB) after booting until the passcode is entered.

by urda 7y ago

lern_too_spel 7y ago

The master key already exists. It is the key used to sign builds. Edit: downvotes of easily verifiable facts are causing hn to block me from responding. At the time Apple made the false marketing claims, no passcode was required to install a signed build. Hence, the FBI's request. The FBI was asking for no more than what Apple could already do, and it was letting Apple control the whole process. The problem was that what Apple could already do disagreed with what Apple told its customers that it could do.

Lownin 7y ago
Except in the case that the device will not accept the build without the user's passcode, right?
- zaroth 7y ago
  Correct. This may not have been perfectly locked down before the secure element, but Apple’s design goal has always been that the device hardware prevents even Apple itself from retrieving encrypted data without the passcode, and that passcode should have a strictly limited number of attempts to guess. Bugs will always be found and it’s a mistake to think even the latest iPhone is immune to attack. In particular, the baseband continues to be a large attack surface, and IMO is the vector most likely used by the Saudis to remotely access iPhones on their cellular network. I’d feel safer if a powered off iPhone did not connect to any network (WiFi, Cell, or USB) after booting until the passcode is entered.