15 ms·
>The software fixes as described sound sensible and it's hard to believe they were not in the original design Without the benefit of hind sight it's not obviou
by treis 8y ago
>The software fixes as described sound sensible and it's hard to believe they were not in the original design
Without the benefit of hind sight it's not obvious that it's a better decision. MCAS being turned off changes the flight characteristics of the plane. If you do that silently you might run into a situation where an aircraft stalls because a pilot is used to having MCAS correcting their input.
- pas 8y agoAn always-on system designed to always override the pilot should be at least as reliable as the control system used by the pilot. Because the 737MAX is supposedly flies like a 737, and because authorities signed off on this without mandating pilot training, this means this system needs to be as reliable as it can - to maintain the illusion. And basically everyone knows that there are some subfields of software engineering where safety is critical. From nuclear reactor/warhead control to healthcare devices, and somewhere right in the middle there should be aviation, and other transportation industry related software (train signaling, braking systems, self-driving whatevers, and so on). And we have Boeing, acting worse than Uber (when they put someone into a Tesla to watch it self-drive without hooking that someone up on intravenous Modafinil).
- cjbprime 8y agoDo the proposed fixes do it silently?
- thinkcontext 8y agoIf both aggressive MCAS is unsafe because pilots can't control the plane and nonaggressive MCAS is unsafe because of stall risk that would seem to imply that 737 MAX should not be certified to fly.