2 ms·
I've heard it suggested [1, 2] the original design for MCAS could only make a small adjustment a single time, which the pilots could easily overcome with the st
by michaelt 8y ago
I've heard it suggested [1, 2] the original design for MCAS could only make a small adjustment a single time, which the pilots could easily overcome with the stick, classifying it a less safety-critical component as it couldn't possibly crash the plane.
Later, the MCAS ended up adjusting the trim multiple times, by an amount the pilots couldn't override with the stick. Thus it should have been safety level DAL-A (loss of plane) [3] - but the safety analysis and MCAS design weren't updated to reflect that.
And the FAA, in what with hindsight seems like a ridiculously naive move, allowed Boeing to self-certify their own faulty safety analysis.
[1] https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/ https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faile...
[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19419454 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19419454
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DO-178B#Software_level https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DO-178B#Software_level