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Thank you, you eloquently expressed the point I was trying to make. To say "we know that quantity Y can never be measurable or observable below discrete length

Thank you, you eloquently expressed the point I was trying to make. To say "we know that quantity Y can never be measurable or observable below discrete length X... but also, Y is continuous and can be subdivided below X, just trust us on this one" doesn't sound like science. Philosophical at best.

coldtea 8y ago
Philosophy is not just saying random stuff and "trust us". And inversely, science is not just measuring -- that's the naive positivist (and later Popperian) view of what scientists do. For example: As Thomas Kuhn (1961) argues, scientific theories are usually accepted long before quantitative methods for testing them become available. The reliability of newly introduced measurement methods is typically tested against the predictions of the theory rather than the other way around. In Kuhn’s words, “The road from scientific law to scientific measurement can rarely be traveled in the reverse direction” (1961: 189). For example, Dalton’s Law, which states that the weights of elements in a chemical compound are related to each other in whole-number proportions, initially conflicted with some of the best known measurements of such proportions. It is only by assuming Dalton’s Law that subsequent experimental chemists were able to correct and improve their measurement techniques (1961: 173). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/measurement-science/#EpiMea https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/measurement-science/#EpiM...
- jrochkind1 8y ago
  All good points. It's not simple or mechanical, and it's often erroneous, but the realm of science is still the realm of that which can be observed and measured, and refuted or confirmed by observation and measurement. Trying to figure out how to do that is what makes it science. It's possible the Uncertainty Principle is wrong. One can come up with theories that it is wrong. And what sorts of observations might hypothetically observe or refute them. As far as I know, there is no serious science doubting HUP at present. (Which doesn't prove it's right, it's just the current state of things). But simply speculating about what things might exist that current scientific understanding says scientific laws would prevent us from observing or measuring or seeing any effects of whatsoever -- is still not science. It's not that you can't have a scientific theory which current measurements seem to refute and still press for it (your Dalton's law example). It's that you can't have a scientific theory with no even theoretical way to refute or confirm it by observation. That's not a scientific theory.
- oarabbus_ 8y ago
  >Philosophy is not just saying random stuff and "trust us". Ok, enlighten me. I've read philosophical works where that certainly seemed to be the case. There's also this weird thing where only a specific lineage of schools of thought and certain ancient Western philosophers are "real philosophy" and others (e.g. anyone with a non-Anglo last name) are "not real philosophers". No True Scotsman at its finest. >And inversely, science is not just measuring -- that's the naive positivist (and later Popperian) view of what scientists do. In graduate school, I worked at a lab in Stanford (I didn't attend there, but was fortunate to have spent some time there). Your statement would certainly be news to the PI I worked for, who was a heavy Popperian. You can't falsify the existence of sub-Planck lengths or times, that's for sure. Science was absolutely nothing more than that to him. And while you can certainly claim an Appeal to Authority fallacy, Stanford, at least, considered my PI competent enough to award him a PhD in a scientific discipline, so I'm not sure how much I can agree with your post.
  - shstalwart 8y ago
    People like to say that "modern" science has moved past Popper. In my opinion, this is because it allows them to attach the gravitas of Science [0] to whatever their pet topic is, even when that topic does not admit falsification. This is not to suggest that we should not inquire on these topics, but rather that they should fall under some other umbrella besides Science. [0] Or whatever is left of it at this point.
  - coldtea 8y ago
    It's not that there aren't scientists that are Popperian. It's that science itself as a process is not Popperian (and of course modern epistemology has moved from the times of Popper).

coldtea 8y ago

Philosophy is not just saying random stuff and "trust us". And inversely, science is not just measuring -- that's the naive positivist (and later Popperian) view of what scientists do. For example: As Thomas Kuhn (1961) argues, scientific theories are usually accepted long before quantitative methods for testing them become available. The reliability of newly introduced measurement methods is typically tested against the predictions of the theory rather than the other way around. In Kuhn’s words, “The road from scientific law to scientific measurement can rarely be traveled in the reverse direction” (1961: 189). For example, Dalton’s Law, which states that the weights of elements in a chemical compound are related to each other in whole-number proportions, initially conflicted with some of the best known measurements of such proportions. It is only by assuming Dalton’s Law that subsequent experimental chemists were able to correct and improve their measurement techniques (1961: 173). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/measurement-science/#EpiMea https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/measurement-science/#EpiM...

jrochkind1 8y ago
All good points. It's not simple or mechanical, and it's often erroneous, but the realm of science is still the realm of that which can be observed and measured, and refuted or confirmed by observation and measurement. Trying to figure out how to do that is what makes it science. It's possible the Uncertainty Principle is wrong. One can come up with theories that it is wrong. And what sorts of observations might hypothetically observe or refute them. As far as I know, there is no serious science doubting HUP at present. (Which doesn't prove it's right, it's just the current state of things). But simply speculating about what things might exist that current scientific understanding says scientific laws would prevent us from observing or measuring or seeing any effects of whatsoever -- is still not science. It's not that you can't have a scientific theory which current measurements seem to refute and still press for it (your Dalton's law example). It's that you can't have a scientific theory with no even theoretical way to refute or confirm it by observation. That's not a scientific theory.
oarabbus_ 8y ago
>Philosophy is not just saying random stuff and "trust us". Ok, enlighten me. I've read philosophical works where that certainly seemed to be the case. There's also this weird thing where only a specific lineage of schools of thought and certain ancient Western philosophers are "real philosophy" and others (e.g. anyone with a non-Anglo last name) are "not real philosophers". No True Scotsman at its finest. >And inversely, science is not just measuring -- that's the naive positivist (and later Popperian) view of what scientists do. In graduate school, I worked at a lab in Stanford (I didn't attend there, but was fortunate to have spent some time there). Your statement would certainly be news to the PI I worked for, who was a heavy Popperian. You can't falsify the existence of sub-Planck lengths or times, that's for sure. Science was absolutely nothing more than that to him. And while you can certainly claim an Appeal to Authority fallacy, Stanford, at least, considered my PI competent enough to award him a PhD in a scientific discipline, so I'm not sure how much I can agree with your post.
- shstalwart 8y ago
  People like to say that "modern" science has moved past Popper. In my opinion, this is because it allows them to attach the gravitas of Science [0] to whatever their pet topic is, even when that topic does not admit falsification. This is not to suggest that we should not inquire on these topics, but rather that they should fall under some other umbrella besides Science. [0] Or whatever is left of it at this point.
- coldtea 8y ago
  It's not that there aren't scientists that are Popperian. It's that science itself as a process is not Popperian (and of course modern epistemology has moved from the times of Popper).