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Talking about what might exist that the laws of nature as we currently understand them would prevent us from ever having any evidence whatsoever of... it's def
by jrochkind1 8y ago
Talking about what might exist that the laws of nature as we currently understand them would prevent us from ever having any evidence whatsoever of... it's def not a scientific claim or inquiry, sounds philosophical to me. If it can't be observed, like it's even theoretically impossible to observe it or have evidence of it, ever... it's not science.
- TeMPOraL 8y ago> If it can't be observed, like it's even theoretically impossible to observe it or have evidence of it, ever... it's not science. More than that. It simply doesn't exist in any meaningful sense and it's a waste of time to even think about it. What cannot be observed in principle has exactly zero impact on the universe. That's pretty much a definiton of "not existing".
- coldtea 8y ago>More than that. It simply doesn't exist in any meaningful sense and it's a waste of time to even think about it. The irony is it's actually a philosophy (a philosophy of science among several in particular) saying the above. It's not anything scientifically observed itself that says that when something can't be measured "it simply doesn't exist in any meaningful sense and it's a waste of time to even think about it".
- 8bitsrule 8y agoScience is not always aware that it has axioms. Historically, absolute time, absolute space, Euclidean geometry, stuff like that. No place for, say, the qualia which motivate it ... beauty, elegance, the like.
- whatshisface 8y agoEuclidian geometry was literally based on axioms from day one.
- coldtea 8y agoWhat the parent means is science doesn't always know it has implicit axioms. And that Euclidean geometry itself is only one possible geometry, but took us several millennia (until e.g. Lobachevsky) to find out -- it was taken as a kind of axiom itself, like absolute time etc.
- TeMPOraL 8y agoYes, this is philosophy of science and technically an axiom. But it's not an arbitrary one. It's saying that "it exists <=> something would be different about the world if it didn't exist <=> it's in principle observable (though its impact) <=> can be studied by science". Call it my lack of imagination, but I don't believe it's even possible to disagree with this axiom; alternatives don't make any kind of sense. EDIT: looking at this "axiom" from another angle. Imagine that I claim that atoms are really built out of Zeta faces, that are exactly like quarks, but have smily faces etched on them. I also claim that it's in principle impossible to tell a difference between a Zeta face and a quark (hypothetical quark, after all it's all Zeta faces). They just are there. At this point you could correctly observe that since the universe would look precisely no different whether or not there are smiley faces on quarks - there's not a bit of information distinguishing these two hypotheses - my claim is absolutely meaningless and a waste of time. This generalizes to all kinds of invisible, unmeasurable magic faries under the bed, etc. (It's probably a well-trodden philosophical ground, but I don't know who to read to find a decent discussion of it.)
- coldtea 8y ago>Yes, this is philosophy of science and technically an axiom. But it's not an arbitrary one. It's saying that "it exists <=> something would be different about the world if it didn't exist <=> it's in principle observable (though its impact) <=> can be studied by science". Call it my lack of imagination, but I don't believe it's even possible to disagree with this axiom; alternatives don't make any kind of sense. There are several logical holes in the axiom. The first big one is that it implies logic is applicable to the universe, i.e. that the universe must abide by logical necessities (and even more so, by logical necessities the way we perceive them). Setting aside the fact that we cannot prove logic's applicability logically (it's itself an axiom), QM has given us many non-classical-logic compliant observations. Then, there's the assumption that: "it exists <=> something would be different about the world if it didn't exist". That's again an assumption. I could just as well consider that (the fact of its existence turning from false to true aside) the world could be the same whether something exists or not. This presupposes when it should instead prove: that existence necessitates difference in the world. Third, "it's in principle observable (though its impact) <=> can be studied by science" -- whether something can be studied by science or not shouldn't be a criterion for its existence. Black holes existed for billions of years before they could be "studied by science", or before science even had any understanding of them. Only in retrospect we say that they "can be studied by science". Did the not exist when we couldn't say that, and exist now? Or they did exist and we only lately came to find out about them, and that we can actually study them? If it's the latter, why wouldn't that -- the possibility of existence- be the case for tons of others things (e.g. sub-plank length stuff)? Because our current theories say so? Or because we thing our current theories are the be-all end-all we'll come up with? Fourth, one could argue that something could still exist, have impact, and not be observable. E.g. if it's impossible to make it not exist, or look at that level (so that we have no way to measure its impact). E.g. some entities or energies at the sub-Plank scale level could hold the universe together and be essential substrate. But we just have no way to know about it, because we can't look at that level (and our theories can't even go at that level). >At this point you could correctly observe that since the universe would look precisely no different whether or not there are smiley faces on quarks - there's not a bit of information distinguishing these two hypotheses - my claim is absolutely meaningless and a waste of time. The claim would be a waste of time to try to verify. It could still very well be ontologically true -- which is what we're discussing. That something that can't be verified in any way doesn't exist is a logical jump. What we can say for certain is that it could or could not exist, but we can't verify it. We can't even say that it has no impact to us, because without being able to verify it, how can we be sure it has no impact? At best we can say "it has no impact as far as we can tell". But it could still have a huge impact -- the same way the Quarks you've mentioned have a huge impact, had a huge impact even before we knew existed and before we could measure them, and would have have a huge impact even if we remained forever at the 15th century level of physical knowledge.
- ngcc_hk 8y agoWhat cannot be observed even indirectly is a better phase. But even that may not be ok. Qm cannot be observed by itself and it collapses once observed. What before collapse cannot be observed. It is not even indirectly observed. Not Like quake which may break in high enough energy. Qm is based on unobserable. The cat before you observe is ... you never know. Observe change it.
- TeMPOraL 8y agoI think "in principle" is still better - what it means that you can't observe it directly, indirectly, infer its existence, etc. There's not a single bit of universe state that would be different depending on existence of phenomenon under question (if even a single bit of state flipped, you could in principle observe it). Qm - I assume you mean wave functions and their collapse - are an explanatory mathematical abstraction, but they follow rules grounded in observational data. You don't say "wave function collapsed there, only it's impossible to measure it"; that's meaningless. We say that the wave function collapses when we find some observation changing from one state to another in a way that implies there were superpositions of state involved in the middle.