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I've built systems which required "helpdesk" type access and had auditing, but the problem is where do think "audit summary report" is on the TODO pile for the
by tialaramex 8y ago
I've built systems which required "helpdesk" type access and had auditing, but the problem is where do think "audit summary report" is on the TODO pile for the people getting those summaries? I'm guessing it's between "Delete unread" and "I really ought to get around to it but I'm too busy so I never do".
Even when it comes to third party audit, those are ring binder driven processes. Does the audit report get generated? Yes, check. Does the person it goes to have a requirement to check it? Yes, check. Done, pass. Auditors _might_ ask to see an example report, but they definitely aren't going to add bogus entries to see what happens for example.
Spot checks aren't a thing in almost any industry. "Chaos Monkey" style checks aren't a thing anywhere at all. So it's easily possible that for six months (or three months) Microsoft was generating internal reports that said "Bob the Helpdesk worker has accessed ten times more user emails today than anybody else" and nobody was asking "Wait, why is Bob an outlier?".
With a targeted attack like this one, your suggestion about requiring a ticket doesn't help very much, the attacker is motivated to jump through hoops unlike script kiddies looking for low-hanging fruit. Insider fraud at banks has been known to go as far as a fake "customer" phoning up to authorize the steps that the bad guys want to take, so that there's an authorization on record when they do them and it won't immediately be flagged as a problem. The real customer may later convince a court that it wasn't them, but that's not real time, the insiders are long gone and so is the money.
Now, you can build systems where it's just impossible for even your own people to get access. But that has a high cost, as you will see in every thread where people castigate Google because they got locked out of something. Why can't Google just hire helpdesk people who have super-user access, they ask...
- 0xffff2 8y ago>Now, you can build systems where it's just impossible for even your own people to get access. But that has a high cost, as you will see in every thread where people castigate Google because they got locked out of something. Why can't Google just hire helpdesk people who have super-user access, they ask... I don't see how allowing helpdesk operators to help users recover access to their accounts has any relation at all to the helpdesk operators having access to the account itself. They need to be able to access and update account metadata, not the account itself.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- tialaramex 8y ago> I don't see how allowing helpdesk operators to help users recover access to their accounts has any relation at all to the helpdesk operators having access to the account itself. They need to be able to access and update account metadata, not the account itself. So in your system the bad guy can't read my email because he only has the ability to access and update account metadata such as my password and the helpdesk system doesn't give him access to the actual email? That would work, unless any of the bad guys is smarter than you and realises that they can use this metadata to... log into my account and read my email.
- theaustinseven 8y agoIf the password is stored in plaintext or can be changed by an admin(in a method other than a reset where the user still sets the new password), we've got other problems.
- 0xffff2 8y ago>That would work, unless any of the bad guys is smarter than you and realises that they can use this metadata to... log into my account and read my email. No need to be so rude and disrespectful. Obviously there needs to be a password reset mechanism. That mechanism can absolutely be designed in a way that does not involve the helpdesk operator having access to the password or the account.
- CamJN 8y agoPeople get locked out of their accounts because in addition to losing their password, they don't have access to the recovery email/phone/whatever which they already set (or never set one at all). If the helpdesk operator has the ability to change or otherwise set a destination for a recovery email/token/pin/secret to be sent then they have the ability to set their own account/device as the trusted reset device/account. There really isn't a way that normal people can use that would allow a helpdesk operator to give them back access to their account without also allowing the helpdesk operator to gain access to the account themselves if they so choose.
- saulrh 8y agoYes, I wouldn't expect to find much rigor at Cousin Ricky's house of email. This is Hotmail. They don't have any excuses. They handle a ton of email for a lot of people, people depend on them, and they are a big target. If this was a specially privileged superuser account, it should have had more attention paid to it. Yes, it's hard to scale audits or monitoring to the entire customer support org. But if you only have three people that can actually read people's emails, you can certainly audit just their use. If it's not a specially privileged superuser, then every random helpdesk account can read everything from everyone. This does not inspire confidence. And even skipping all the complex systems that should have been in place for a system the size of Hotmail: Why did this account not have 2FA? This is basic stuff.
- arcbyte 8y agoArcbyte@cousinrickeyshouseofemail.com has a nice ring to it
- dragonwriter 8y ago> Yes, I wouldn't expect to find much rigor at Cousin Ricky's house of email. This is Hotmail. They don't have any excuses. It's consumer Hotmail. From Microsoft’s perspective, that is probably excuse enough. Of course, I've seen pretty bad things in large HIPAA covered entities with systems with PHI; insufficient security and accountability of support accounts and recovery processes is found lots of places.
- jammygit 8y agoI wonder how fastmail is in this regard. Makes me want to reopen my protonmail account honestly
- RandomBacon 8y agoThey definitely have access to at least some things. Not sure how it's audited or managed, etc on the backend. I had a problem with something, and what they said seemed to indicate the person I messaged looked at my stored information. I do like that they have customer service though.
- dragonwriter 8y ago> I've built systems which required "helpdesk" type access and had auditing, but the problem is where do think "audit summary report" is on the TODO pile for the people getting those summaries? I'm guessing it's between "Delete unread" and "I really ought to get around to it but I'm too busy so I never do". Auditing isn't a system feature, it's a business process feature. A system can have logging and even detection of situations requiring auditing, but if no one is systematically reviewing—auditing—the results, it doesn't have auditing.
- tialaramex 8y agoThis is an excellent point, thank you for putting it that way. I can't correct my post now, but this point is something I will definitely emphasise in any future system where I'm told audit is a requirement but I doubt that my technical work will actually deliver the effect intended because the "business process" part won't get done.