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Would these kind of attacks be made redundant by Galileo?
by anonymousDan 8y ago
Would these kind of attacks be made redundant by Galileo?
- heavenlyblue 8y agoDoes Galileo work somehow differently as opposed to GPS?
- anonymousDan 8y agoI recall reading that the Galileo signals have some built in authentication scheme, e.g. something along the lines of what is mentioned here: https://www.gsa.europa.eu/newsroom/news/new-funding-opportunity-galileo-open-service-authentication-user-terminal https://www.gsa.europa.eu/newsroom/news/new-funding-opportun... I would have thought that the military level GPS signals might have something similar already.
- michaelt 8y agoTLDR: no. GPS spoofing can be done as a replay attack; record the signal at the airport, rebroadcast at the Kremlin louder than the direct satellite signal and voilà, your receiver says you’re at the airport. As it’s just a replay attack of the original signal, encryption can’t help.
- woodruffw 8y ago> As it’s just a replay attack of the original signal, encryption can’t help. Couldn't this be mitigated by added a nonce or using CBC within the cryptosystem? Replay attacks are well understood; I'd be surprised if any (eventual) proposal for signed/encrypted GPS didn't include something to defend against them.
- jhayward 8y agoAs I loosely explained in another comment, you essentially never see repeats. The replay happens at the speed of light, and time stamps are broadcast once every 6 seconds at 50 BPS. The receiver sees the rebroadcast because it captures the receiver's RF chain by being the strongest signal.