Their falling growth is the biggest concern for investors. 2016-7: 100% revenue growth, 105% trips, 51% MAPC 2017-8: 40% revenue growth, 40% trips, 33% MAPC (M

Their falling growth is the biggest concern for investors. 2016-7: 100% revenue growth, 105% trips, 51% MAPC 2017-8: 40% revenue growth, 40% trips, 33% MAPC (MAPC = active users) These are sharp drops in the growth rate. The quarterly revenue data is more worrying - December Quarter 2018 was up only 22% over the previous year. (Page 121) On Page 126 we see that even that revenue increase was subsidised by excess driver incentives, and netting that out the growth was only 17% year on year. They have tightened things and their adjusted yearly EBITDA loss fell by $800m to $1.65 billion, but has this come at the expense of growth? Or has the growth simply become too expensive to chase? Or are electric mobility devices taking away the shorter distance rides? And they had a loss of $890 million in the last quarter, and it's hard to see tangible evidence of margin improvement. (P128) A valuation today of, say, $100 million needs to have net income of, say, $10 billion to be a very real probability relatively soon, or of one much larger later. At, say, a 20% net margin and 40% growth $10 billion income would take 5 years. But that is a courageous assumption about the growth rate, given the above, and it also assumes significant margin improvement, which will be hard if the marketing spend continues, which itself is required for growth. And pricing is hard because increased prices simply move customers onto other platforms. This is not a winner take all market. For the model to work Uber Eats growth needs to be maintained for a while, and that's possibility, although I suspect their margins will be sharply squeezed as big brand chains respond. (e.g with Mobi2Go and 3rd party delivery agencies they can roll their own)