I'm unconvinced that a software routine (MCAS) that can be (indirectly) disabled, and pilots are instructed to disable in the case of MCAS upset, is an acceptab

I'm unconvinced that a software routine (MCAS) that can be (indirectly) disabled, and pilots are instructed to disable in the case of MCAS upset, is an acceptable work around for any portion of FAR 25 certification. I think it's more likely that MCAS was intended to avoid a new type certificate for the MAX, thereby triggering FAR 61.31(a) requiring that the pilot be type rated. Either way we have a problem here, as I see it. The aircraft flight manual and emergency AD 2018-23-51 specifically recommend a procedure that instantly makes the airplane not airworthy, or renders the pilot flying an airplane with behavior he's not really type rated for. This seems highly problematic, and I'm not able to account for it.