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Root cause analysis: excessive pressure to keep type rating caused lax engineering to be considered acceptable. Fix:let the FAA do it's job independently
by ggm 8y ago
Root cause analysis: excessive pressure to keep type rating caused lax engineering to be considered acceptable.
Fix:let the FAA do it's job independently
- mjevans 8y agoFix: Make Engineers actually liable for the correct classification of systems and require signed justification for NOT defaulting to the highest possible standard.
- ggm 8y ago...which demands a fully independent FAA. Not the one we seem to have which appears on the face of it, compromised by the consequences of embedded self assessment and 'same type' rules. Why was it in the national interest to have Boeing get 'same type' ? Because of the cost of competing with airbus. The regulator was hamstrung in the interests of 'efficiency' (I'm not an American and this is an argument i read which resonates. I'd welcome good rebuttal)
- rusticpenn 8y agoThis also causes a lot of over engineering. ( Which maybe good for Boeing right about now)
- ggm 8y agoI'd dispute it causes the over-engineering. Engineering principles cause safety margins, and regulators enforce safety margins. As the industry decides it can live with reduced safety margins they get reduced. When they get too close to a risk window, they get raised. I know the over-engineering term exists, but I think it's based on flawed logic. Not having margins results in under-engineering, which is significantly worse in almost all cases. Its not a symmetric world out there. Some things are worse than others.
- zepearl 8y agoOn a technical level: personally I think that the root cause could be a lack of "integration" of the system (MCAS) with the rest. Meaning that e.g. 1) if the pilots' yokes/sticks are being pulled and 2) if the altitude based on gps and/or air pressure and/or radar is decreasing and 3) if the speed registered by the airspeed probe is high respectively increasing and 4) if the fuel being used by the engines to keep or even increase the speed is very low and 5) if the G-force registered by <some sensor, if it exists?> is lower than usual (neutral or even negative?) 6) etc... (anything else excluding AoA?) ...then the airplane is mooost probably "going down", even if the AoA says the opposite. As the MCAS auto-trim has apparently a big potential impact on how the airplane flies (surfaces on the tail are big and their angle can move a lot), it should therefore not rely on just 1 (or even 2 duplicate) lonely sensor(s) but on multiple types that provide multiple point-of-views of the aircraft's situation to then abstract/determine/confirm the current high-level situation (in this case "is the aircraft going up or down?") and only after such result to react/take countermeasures to save the aircraft respectively help the pilots and/or lower costs for the flight. If this is not totally wrong, is this (the total integration of all sensors) how Airbus did it with their super-automated systems like e.g. their side-sticks/joysticks just telling the airplane what pilots "want"? (meaning, did they start already from scratch creating a totally integrated system, if they did create such an integrated system?) (not sure about how automated the new Boeing airplanes are, so I did not mention them...)
- bbojan 8y agoAngle of attack is not related to any of the items that you list. You could be approaching stall even while your altitude is increasing (2), while you are at a high speed (3), at less than 1 G (5) etc. I'm not sure you quite understand what a stall is. A great resource I can recommend is a book called See How it Flies (http://www.av8n.com/how/ http://www.av8n.com/how/).
- zepearl 8y agoI never mentioned "stall"... . EDIT: expanding: I understand "stall" as an end-result, and AoA as one of the sensors that might be an indicator of a "stall" EDIT2: thx for that URL => I'll have a look at it - looks very interesting.
- RespectForTruth 8y agoYou hit the nail on the head with this.