Assuming that there are many software subsystems that need angle of attack input, it shouldn't be the responsibility of every one of those systems to try and de

Assuming that there are many software subsystems that need angle of attack input, it shouldn't be the responsibility of every one of those systems to try and determine if they are receiving bad input from the AOA indicator. Rather, there should be one angle of attack (AOA) sensing software system which feeds AOA data into all the other dependent systems. If the AOA sensing software system cannot determine a reliable value, then it should feed a value of "I don't know" to the downstream subsystems. Then, all possible expertise about how to determine if the AOA input is valid (and I'm sure there are many, many, such factors, redundant physical sensors being just one) can be directed to that one AOA sensing system. If MCAS gets an input of "I don't know" from the AOA sensing system, then clearly it is going to disable itself. So, a complex decision has been turned into a very simple one. If you agree with me, then this is a really important example of why separation of concerns is so important.