If you read about Air France Flight 447, at some point instruments data went so ridiculously far from expected values that the stall warning stopped, because th

If you read about Air France Flight 447, at some point instruments data went so ridiculously far from expected values that the stall warning stopped, because the computer did exactly what is suggested here: rejecting ridiculous data. So trying to fight the stall would... trigger the stall warning, adding confusion and cognitive load to an already dire situation (IIRC it is very likely, though we will never know, that the pilots didn't quite understand until the very end that the plane had stalled). The "solution" described in the article seems to add more complexity and surprises to a system (MCAS) that already behaves in surprising and unexpected ways. Engineering is hard, adding a band aid on top of an ill devised clutch without carefully thinking, writing, and peer reviewing all the possible consequences, is unlikely to help.