6 ms·

Then don't buy such a device which clearly doesn't meet your needs. Why should every personal computing device on the planet be tailored to your requirements, a

by shawnz 8y ago

Then don't buy such a device which clearly doesn't meet your needs. Why should every personal computing device on the planet be tailored to your requirements, at the cost of safety for the majority of other users? Most people don't use PiHole, they use Adblock or uBlock which are not affected by this. It's not as though they are taking away your ability to use adblocking technology.

EvanAnderson 8y ago
Macro-level view: The Mozilla Foundation may think that DNS-over-HTTPS is about "safety", but they're unwittingly furthering the agenda of those who would profit from the Internet not being decentralized. A decentralized Internet filled with devices that end users can control, should they choose, is a good thing for society, I'd argue. DNS-over-HTTPS is another piece of technology that can be used to eliminate that. It is not necessary to hand over freedom in exchange for "safety" or "security". Micro-level view: I'm a sysadmin for my Customers, my family, and some of my friends. Inevitably I will have to deal with these awful devices. So will countless other sysadmins. I'm dreading having to deal with devices that invade my users' privacy, thwart my attempts at detecting bad actors on the network, and that just generally act like the person who paid for them doesn't actually own them.
- shawnz 8y ago
  Regarding your second point, this change will improve privacy for your clients and make it harder for bad actors to take advantage of your network. So what's not to like? Just because your old tooling won't work anymore doesn't mean that this change is a bad thing for clients.
  - vetinari 8y ago
    If it improves privacy for the clients, it also improves privacy for the malware, and you won't be able to monitor or be alerted of it.
    - deleted 8y ago
      [deleted]
    - stirfrykitty 8y ago
      Most modern firewalls can decrypt/re-encrypt all traffic on the fly. The end user doesn't even notice. I've done this at my last two jobs. More here: https://knowledgebase.paloaltonetworks.com/KCSArticleDetail?id=kA10g000000ClEZCA0 https://knowledgebase.paloaltonetworks.com/KCSArticleDetail?...
      - Murrawhip 8y ago
        What? The end user does notice if you haven't added the CA to the end user's PC.
      - syshum 8y ago
        That works by Man in the middle attacks of SSL and Only works on Enterprise Networks for devices owned by the enterprise because the Enterprise Installs their own Root Certs on all devices that "tricks" the browsers into believing they are "google.com" not the real google.com
        shawnz 8y ago
        Right, which is exactly how it should be. If you want to perform a purposeful man in the middle attack on your clients, then you SHOULD be required to install your root cert on their workstations. With unencrypted DNS, it just means that you can perform the same attack with NO specific approval by the client workstation. How is that better?
        snazz 8y ago
        You get an HTTPS error if someone performs a DNS MITM and you’re not set up specifically to trust their certificate. It’s equivalent to performing an HTTPS MITM without the root cert installed.
        vetinari 8y ago
  - JohnFen 8y ago
    > make it harder for bad actors to take advantage of your network. How so? It looks to me like it makes it easier for bad actors to take advantage of my network, by making it harder to detect and block DNS lookups.
    - glennpratt 8y ago
      You are focused on unsophisticated bad actors if DNS is all it takes to block.
      - JohnFen 8y ago
        I don't understand your point. I'm certainly not solely focused on the unsophisticated ones, but those sorts are important too. And they're much more common as they include ad and other trackers.
        glennpratt 8y ago
        You want a warm blanket that you blocked some well known ad click tracker while having no real visibility overall. Security theater.
        JohnFen 8y ago
        You would be correct if that were my attitude, but it's not. This is not a panacea, it's one component in a larger security posture.
        shawnz 8y ago
        If DNS-based access control is not sufficient on it's own, then is it really worth it to block DoH (which could have other significant security and privacy benefits) just to retain the possibility of using it? Why not focus on improving those other, already necessary access control technologies and forget about abusing DNS for this purpose, so we get the best of both worlds?
- techntoke 8y ago
  This is what Mozilla has been doing for a while. They enable advertisers and bad actors to profile you without any sane safeguards to prevent websites from running JavaScript code that is used in a nefarious way. If they were actually focused on protecting users, they would be working with IPFS and building other tools to help hide user identities through a permission-based system. Chrome is just as guilty, but it's not like Mozilla is trying to define new web standards to prevent this type of activity. They may as well be working together.
  - apostacy 8y ago
    Don't know why you are getting downvoted when you are completely correct. There's so much that Mozilla could do structurally, but they are terrified of rocking the boat or disrupting their corporate underwriters. Just like earlier today, with their anti malicious javascript features[1]; they could look into empowering the users and changing the structure of how js is run in the browser. But that might threaten advertisers, so instead they opted for a clumsly blacklisting solution instead. If you want an accurate heuristic for predicting Mozilla's behavior, just ask "What would Google want?". It may not be Google in particular that these decisions benefit, but they absolutely benefit those entities that are locking down and siloing the internet. [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19614808 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19614808
swiley 8y ago
> Then don't buy such a device which clearly doesn't meet your needs. That would be nice in an ideal world, unfortunately most of us live in reality.
- shawnz 8y ago
  I don't know about you, but in the reality in which I live, privacy of the domain names I visit is a much bigger concern than being able to do access control with a technology that's not even made for access control.
apostacy 8y ago
Then Mozilla should make a crippled "safe" version of their browser that has a hard coded list of trusted servers then. Because by making this the default, they are helping centralize the internet and greatly benefiting the entrenched powers while putting barriers to entry for the rest of us.

by shawnz 8y ago

EvanAnderson 8y ago

Macro-level view: The Mozilla Foundation may think that DNS-over-HTTPS is about "safety", but they're unwittingly furthering the agenda of those who would profit from the Internet not being decentralized. A decentralized Internet filled with devices that end users can control, should they choose, is a good thing for society, I'd argue. DNS-over-HTTPS is another piece of technology that can be used to eliminate that. It is not necessary to hand over freedom in exchange for "safety" or "security". Micro-level view: I'm a sysadmin for my Customers, my family, and some of my friends. Inevitably I will have to deal with these awful devices. So will countless other sysadmins. I'm dreading having to deal with devices that invade my users' privacy, thwart my attempts at detecting bad actors on the network, and that just generally act like the person who paid for them doesn't actually own them.

shawnz 8y ago
Regarding your second point, this change will improve privacy for your clients and make it harder for bad actors to take advantage of your network. So what's not to like? Just because your old tooling won't work anymore doesn't mean that this change is a bad thing for clients.
- vetinari 8y ago
  If it improves privacy for the clients, it also improves privacy for the malware, and you won't be able to monitor or be alerted of it.
  - deleted 8y ago
    [deleted]
  - stirfrykitty 8y ago
    Most modern firewalls can decrypt/re-encrypt all traffic on the fly. The end user doesn't even notice. I've done this at my last two jobs. More here: https://knowledgebase.paloaltonetworks.com/KCSArticleDetail?id=kA10g000000ClEZCA0 https://knowledgebase.paloaltonetworks.com/KCSArticleDetail?...
    - Murrawhip 8y ago
      What? The end user does notice if you haven't added the CA to the end user's PC.
    - syshum 8y ago
      That works by Man in the middle attacks of SSL and Only works on Enterprise Networks for devices owned by the enterprise because the Enterprise Installs their own Root Certs on all devices that "tricks" the browsers into believing they are "google.com" not the real google.com
      - shawnz 8y ago
        Right, which is exactly how it should be. If you want to perform a purposeful man in the middle attack on your clients, then you SHOULD be required to install your root cert on their workstations. With unencrypted DNS, it just means that you can perform the same attack with NO specific approval by the client workstation. How is that better?
        snazz 8y ago
        You get an HTTPS error if someone performs a DNS MITM and you’re not set up specifically to trust their certificate. It’s equivalent to performing an HTTPS MITM without the root cert installed.
      - vetinari 8y ago
- JohnFen 8y ago
  > make it harder for bad actors to take advantage of your network. How so? It looks to me like it makes it easier for bad actors to take advantage of my network, by making it harder to detect and block DNS lookups.
  - glennpratt 8y ago
    You are focused on unsophisticated bad actors if DNS is all it takes to block.
    - JohnFen 8y ago
      I don't understand your point. I'm certainly not solely focused on the unsophisticated ones, but those sorts are important too. And they're much more common as they include ad and other trackers.
      - glennpratt 8y ago
        You want a warm blanket that you blocked some well known ad click tracker while having no real visibility overall. Security theater.
        JohnFen 8y ago
        You would be correct if that were my attitude, but it's not. This is not a panacea, it's one component in a larger security posture.
        shawnz 8y ago
        If DNS-based access control is not sufficient on it's own, then is it really worth it to block DoH (which could have other significant security and privacy benefits) just to retain the possibility of using it? Why not focus on improving those other, already necessary access control technologies and forget about abusing DNS for this purpose, so we get the best of both worlds?
techntoke 8y ago
This is what Mozilla has been doing for a while. They enable advertisers and bad actors to profile you without any sane safeguards to prevent websites from running JavaScript code that is used in a nefarious way. If they were actually focused on protecting users, they would be working with IPFS and building other tools to help hide user identities through a permission-based system. Chrome is just as guilty, but it's not like Mozilla is trying to define new web standards to prevent this type of activity. They may as well be working together.
- apostacy 8y ago
  Don't know why you are getting downvoted when you are completely correct. There's so much that Mozilla could do structurally, but they are terrified of rocking the boat or disrupting their corporate underwriters. Just like earlier today, with their anti malicious javascript features[1]; they could look into empowering the users and changing the structure of how js is run in the browser. But that might threaten advertisers, so instead they opted for a clumsly blacklisting solution instead. If you want an accurate heuristic for predicting Mozilla's behavior, just ask "What would Google want?". It may not be Google in particular that these decisions benefit, but they absolutely benefit those entities that are locking down and siloing the internet. [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19614808 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19614808

swiley 8y ago

> Then don't buy such a device which clearly doesn't meet your needs. That would be nice in an ideal world, unfortunately most of us live in reality.

shawnz 8y ago
I don't know about you, but in the reality in which I live, privacy of the domain names I visit is a much bigger concern than being able to do access control with a technology that's not even made for access control.

apostacy 8y ago

Then Mozilla should make a crippled "safe" version of their browser that has a hard coded list of trusted servers then. Because by making this the default, they are helping centralize the internet and greatly benefiting the entrenched powers while putting barriers to entry for the rest of us.