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Germany will in fact have the worst ratio of population per member of parliament after the 2019 elections, with 860k people per MEP vs Maltas 77k people per MEP

by w-m 8y ago

Germany will in fact have the worst ratio of population per member of parliament after the 2019 elections, with 860k people per MEP vs Maltas 77k people per MEP, on the other end of the scale: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apportionment_in_the_European_Parliament#2019_election https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apportionment_in_the_European_...

khuey 8y ago
Wow. That's even worse than the US Electoral College (where California has approximately 700k people per vote while Wyoming has only approximately 200k people per vote).
- matthewmacleod 8y ago
  Worth bearing in mind, however, that this is a deliberate decision stemming from the founding of the ECSC – the goal being to make sure that votes in smaller member states have additional political power to help offset the de facto greater economic and soft power of larger states. Like all of these things, it's a bit of a fudge and it's reasonable to ask if it's the right approach – but it's not an accidental outcome.
  - anbop 8y ago
    That’s true of the Electoral College as well, but doesn’t and shouldn’t insulate it from criticism.
  - aitchnyu 8y ago
    Is there an Optimal Constituency Algorithm that one can apply to their government to ensure less populous constituencies still get represented?
- mlindner 8y ago
  That was done intentionally to insulate the smaller/less populated states from the control of larger/more populated states.
- angusp 8y ago
  You say worse, but these discrepancies are by design, both in the US and EU. They’re there to stop much larger interests from steamrollering smaller but different interests that they might not care about or understand
  - int_19h 8y ago
    That all comes with some strings attached, as the very same people who negotiated that compromise in US have noted: "If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy. ... It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction, than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by obstructing the progress of government at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely to be done, but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods. ... It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people of America; and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration." (Federalist Papers, #22) This was originally written to explain why one-state-one-vote arrangement that existed under the Articles of Confederation was not an acceptable arrangement. But it clearly applies to EC and similar systems as well - the only question is where the "fatal" line is.

by w-m 8y ago

khuey 8y ago

Wow. That's even worse than the US Electoral College (where California has approximately 700k people per vote while Wyoming has only approximately 200k people per vote).

matthewmacleod 8y ago
Worth bearing in mind, however, that this is a deliberate decision stemming from the founding of the ECSC – the goal being to make sure that votes in smaller member states have additional political power to help offset the de facto greater economic and soft power of larger states. Like all of these things, it's a bit of a fudge and it's reasonable to ask if it's the right approach – but it's not an accidental outcome.
- anbop 8y ago
  That’s true of the Electoral College as well, but doesn’t and shouldn’t insulate it from criticism.
- aitchnyu 8y ago
  Is there an Optimal Constituency Algorithm that one can apply to their government to ensure less populous constituencies still get represented?
mlindner 8y ago
That was done intentionally to insulate the smaller/less populated states from the control of larger/more populated states.
angusp 8y ago
You say worse, but these discrepancies are by design, both in the US and EU. They’re there to stop much larger interests from steamrollering smaller but different interests that they might not care about or understand
- int_19h 8y ago
  That all comes with some strings attached, as the very same people who negotiated that compromise in US have noted: "If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that something may be done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes border upon anarchy. ... It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic faction, than that which permits the sense of the majority to decide; though the contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake has proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs that may be occasioned by obstructing the progress of government at certain critical seasons. When the concurrence of a large number is required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely to be done, but we forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods. ... It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people of America; and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration." (Federalist Papers, #22) This was originally written to explain why one-state-one-vote arrangement that existed under the Articles of Confederation was not an acceptable arrangement. But it clearly applies to EC and similar systems as well - the only question is where the "fatal" line is.