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> the vulnerability of [cryptography] Well, no. Competently done crypto is uncrackable for all practical purposes without side-channel attacks. Or, maybe, quan
by JoachimSchipper 16y ago
> the vulnerability of [cryptography]
Well, no. Competently done crypto is uncrackable for all practical purposes without side-channel attacks. Or, maybe, quantum computers (RSA; but why would you use RSA for this?)
- ergo98 16y agoWell, yes, of course. Competently done. Competently done crypotgraphy is rare, and most common cryptography is not competently done. Which is exactly the point of my post.
- JoachimSchipper 16y agoMost crypto implementations are vulnerable, yes, but the percentage of vulnerable deployed crypto implementations as a fraction of all deployed implementations looks much better. Note that I'm talking crypto: the OpenSSL people seem quite able to make all sorts of mistakes, but it's almost never the crypto itself that is at fault. (Today's news: a workaround for Netscape's stupidities apparently allows attackers to downgrade to a worse protocol suite in certain cases. Stupid bug, but not crypto per se.) So yes, there are errors, but publishing something AES-encrypted and giving away, say, half the key doesn't tell us anything about those.
- arethuza 16y agoAre there any forms of encryption which take a predictable and precisely defined amount of computing power to decrypt? e.g. Some asymmetric so that I could encrypt something easily but then require someone who wants to decrypt the message to perform 100 Trillion operations to decrypt it?
- JoachimSchipper 16y agoIt's almost always probabilistic - someone guessing the right key the first time could break it very quickly. It may be possible to reduce variance in cracking times by requiring multiple cracks (use a secret sharing scheme to break up the "real" key in chunks; encrypt each chunk in a crackable way.)