3 ms·

That's definitely progress, but there's more work needed to make it usable enough to be on by default.

Reelin 8y ago
As far as I understand it, this already is on by default for ChromeOS. The kernel patches make it possible to utilize internal USB devices during the boot process without disabling protection - ie there's no vulnerability window prior to user space being up and running. I believe the major missing piece for desktop Linux at this point is that many input devices (including my own) are USB based. Without a way for the device to cryptographically attest its identity, you either have to accept vulnerability from wired external devices during boot or do without input until user space has been started. Edit: My mistake. It appears that it was opt-in as of January, will become on-by-default at some point in the future, and only blocks devices during boot and while the screen is locked. It appears to trust all devices plugged into it once you've logged in. (https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2019/01/07/google-shields-chromebooks-from-sneaky-usb-attacks https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2019/01/07/google-sh...)
- hopler 8y ago
  The only reason your laptop is trusted is because you trust the person who gave you the laptop. The same threat model applies to the first keyboard you get for your desktop. Neither laptop/desktop nor keyboard is inherently more trustworthy.
  - Reelin 8y ago
    I'm not worried about the keyboard I purchased or my hardware vendor. Well I am, but far less so than the prospect of a foreign USB device being plugged in and managing to execute malicious code. Think someone quickly inserting a device as they walk by, secretly swapping out one of my peripherals while I'm not around, or similar. Authorization on first use is more than sufficient to mitigate this type of attack, and if you add end-to-end encryption you can also prevent USB keyloggers.

As far as I understand it, this already is on by default for ChromeOS. The kernel patches make it possible to utilize internal USB devices during the boot process without disabling protection - ie there's no vulnerability window prior to user space being up and running. I believe the major missing piece for desktop Linux at this point is that many input devices (including my own) are USB based. Without a way for the device to cryptographically attest its identity, you either have to accept vulnerability from wired external devices during boot or do without input until user space has been started. Edit: My mistake. It appears that it was opt-in as of January, will become on-by-default at some point in the future, and only blocks devices during boot and while the screen is locked. It appears to trust all devices plugged into it once you've logged in. (https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2019/01/07/google-shields-chromebooks-from-sneaky-usb-attacks https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2019/01/07/google-sh...)

hopler 8y ago
The only reason your laptop is trusted is because you trust the person who gave you the laptop. The same threat model applies to the first keyboard you get for your desktop. Neither laptop/desktop nor keyboard is inherently more trustworthy.
- Reelin 8y ago
  I'm not worried about the keyboard I purchased or my hardware vendor. Well I am, but far less so than the prospect of a foreign USB device being plugged in and managing to execute malicious code. Think someone quickly inserting a device as they walk by, secretly swapping out one of my peripherals while I'm not around, or similar. Authorization on first use is more than sufficient to mitigate this type of attack, and if you add end-to-end encryption you can also prevent USB keyloggers.