4 ms·

This plane is dead. People just haven’t accepted it yet.

cryptonector 8y ago
I think that would be unfortunate. I don't think it should die over this. The issues are eminently fixable. But a number of executives may have to exit Boeing, and the FAA, in order for the plane to not die, and all the issues must be fixed of course.
- tanilama 8y ago
  > The issues are eminently fixable Not really. I am no expert, that is why I no longer trust FAA/Boeing telling me it is safe any more, at least in this particular case. As a passenger, I would avoid buying tickets from this plane even it means more cost
  - DuskStar 8y ago
    What about it isn't fixable? Redundant (and thus more reliable) AOA sensors + a less aggressive MCAS system that at maximum displacement can't override the yoke would be more than enough of a fix for me.
    - m_mueller 8y ago
      Not GP but I'm mainly wondering about the likelihood of departure stalls with this design.
      - cryptonector 8y ago
        In the event that MCAS is disabled, the pilots will have to work harder to notice impending stalls and prevent them. Which is why this requires training.
        m_mueller 8y ago
        It's disabled with wings in departure configuration though isn't it? Isn't a scenario likely (i.e. another 10E-5) where a stall happens right on takeoff, say because of updraft or pilot error (although without training on this plane it would be hard to even call it that).
    - cryptonector 8y ago
      No need to make MCAS less aggressive. Training + an alarm should be sufficient. Even now, with no other changes at all, training might well be sufficient, though I'd much rather they make the system more robust and add an alarm.
      - ulfw 8y ago
        No training in the world will help if this system malfunctions and puts the nose down at 1000ft already. You can't react fast enough to not hit the ground. Also I don't want to fly in a plane where 'trained' pilots have to fearfully watched every feet they climb to quickly overturn a system that malfunctions.
        cryptonector 8y ago
        That's clearly not true, since the day before the Lion Air crash a pilot flying in the jump seat was able to diagnose and correct the issue.
        ulfw 8y ago
        At 40,000 feet you have ample time to react. At 1000 you don‘t. That‘s my argument.
        cryptonector 8y ago
        IIUC the incident the day before the Lion Air crash was also on take-off.
      - kalleboo 8y ago
        My minimum requirements would be: * Manual MCAS cut-out switch that leaves the electronic trim available, without resorting to "hacks" like using the flaps. * AoA disagree warning option on all planes, maybe even auto-cut out MCAS when disagree happens. * Simulator training for all pilots on all MCAS failure scenarios and flying without MCAS.

I think that would be unfortunate. I don't think it should die over this. The issues are eminently fixable. But a number of executives may have to exit Boeing, and the FAA, in order for the plane to not die, and all the issues must be fixed of course.

tanilama 8y ago
> The issues are eminently fixable Not really. I am no expert, that is why I no longer trust FAA/Boeing telling me it is safe any more, at least in this particular case. As a passenger, I would avoid buying tickets from this plane even it means more cost
- DuskStar 8y ago
  What about it isn't fixable? Redundant (and thus more reliable) AOA sensors + a less aggressive MCAS system that at maximum displacement can't override the yoke would be more than enough of a fix for me.
  - m_mueller 8y ago
    Not GP but I'm mainly wondering about the likelihood of departure stalls with this design.
    - cryptonector 8y ago
      In the event that MCAS is disabled, the pilots will have to work harder to notice impending stalls and prevent them. Which is why this requires training.
      - m_mueller 8y ago
        It's disabled with wings in departure configuration though isn't it? Isn't a scenario likely (i.e. another 10E-5) where a stall happens right on takeoff, say because of updraft or pilot error (although without training on this plane it would be hard to even call it that).
  - cryptonector 8y ago
    No need to make MCAS less aggressive. Training + an alarm should be sufficient. Even now, with no other changes at all, training might well be sufficient, though I'd much rather they make the system more robust and add an alarm.
    - ulfw 8y ago
      No training in the world will help if this system malfunctions and puts the nose down at 1000ft already. You can't react fast enough to not hit the ground. Also I don't want to fly in a plane where 'trained' pilots have to fearfully watched every feet they climb to quickly overturn a system that malfunctions.
      - cryptonector 8y ago
        That's clearly not true, since the day before the Lion Air crash a pilot flying in the jump seat was able to diagnose and correct the issue.
        ulfw 8y ago
        At 40,000 feet you have ample time to react. At 1000 you don‘t. That‘s my argument.
        cryptonector 8y ago
        IIUC the incident the day before the Lion Air crash was also on take-off.
    - kalleboo 8y ago
      My minimum requirements would be: * Manual MCAS cut-out switch that leaves the electronic trim available, without resorting to "hacks" like using the flaps. * AoA disagree warning option on all planes, maybe even auto-cut out MCAS when disagree happens. * Simulator training for all pilots on all MCAS failure scenarios and flying without MCAS.