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I agree, we need someone like Michael Barr to comb thru supposedly clean safety certified Ada codebase (in reality most likely full of C++ garbage).
by rasz 8y ago
I agree, we need someone like Michael Barr to comb thru supposedly clean safety certified Ada codebase (in reality most likely full of C++ garbage).
- 4thaccount 8y agoIs there a percentage pie chart for what was used on the MAX? Like 80% Ada, 15% C++, and 5% C? I wonder if we'll see a move to things like Spark where proof verification becomes more standard? I don't know much about avionics software, so any educated comments are welcome.
- fmihaila 8y ago> Is there a percentage pie chart for what was used on the MAX? Like 80% Ada, 15% C++, and 5% C? I wonder if we'll see a move to things like Spark where proof verification becomes more standard? I don't know much about avionics software, so any educated comments are welcome. It's not about software verification. In this case, the verifier would have given it a pass (with respect to this particular accident). It's about bad management/bad requirements: - "minimization of pilot training is the overarching requirement" - "it's okay to feed only a single sensor into MCAS, even though there are two of them on the plane" - "it's okay to sell critical safety equipment as options costing extra" - "it's okay to not tell any pilot about any of this, since we practically didn't change anything". This particular one is not about C++.
- 4thaccount 8y agoAgreed that static analysis/proof verification only gets you so far. I was just thinking that the visibility of the incident might lead to some companies asking how they can go even further to make things safer. Of course the first and most important steps consist of what you're saying above, followed by doing whatever they can on the software front if they aren't doing it already.
- mrpippy 8y agoThe problem here is not a software bug—-the software performed as designed, the design was just bad.
- Gibbon1 8y agoYeah there was exactly one single point probably mechanical failure, the AOA sensor. I'm coming down on the side of the cause of these accidents was due to the failure to properly type certify the aircraft. Because they were trying to avoid that they failed to do the system analysis and testing including simulator testing that would have easily found this.