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It seems like this kinda' just pushes the issue around. For example, how do we know that the Ginseng compiler is trustworthy? Of course, there could be a trus
by njacobs5074 8y ago
It seems like this kinda' just pushes the issue around. For example, how do we know that the Ginseng compiler is trustworthy? Of course, there could be a trusted authority for it but I don't see how this is different from a trusted authority for an OS.
- aidenn0 8y agoSufficiently complex operating systems will never be trustworthy not because of maliciousness, but because of bugs. Pick any old version of Linux and browse the local privilege escalation attacks. It seems likely that recent versions of linux have as-yet undiscovered attacks. The existence of even one means that the OS is not trustworthy in the presence of non-trustworthy applications. As long as Ginseng is more amenable to verification than the Linux kernel, this isn't just pushing the issue around, but rather reducing the work needed.
- muxator 8y agoKen Thompson talks about this in 1984, when giving his acceptance speech for the ACM Turing Award. Reflections On Trusting Trust, http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html