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> We remain confident in the fundamental safety of the 737 MAX He just finished several paragraphs about how the plane and it's software was not safe ("erroneo
by DevX101 8y ago
> We remain confident in the fundamental safety of the 737 MAX
He just finished several paragraphs about how the plane and it's software was not safe ("erroneous activation of the MCAS function"), and then arrives at this conclusion?
If my car erroneously responds to the pressure on the gas pedal it's not safe.
- toomuchtodo 8y agoIf he says anything other than that, odds of the 737 MAX being scrapped entirely (from customer and air passenger pressure) goes up. Saving face to save the share price.
- cwalv 8y agoMaybe it shouldn't be, but your comment is surprisingly cynical to me. I don't believe share price is at the front of his mind, nor any of the engineers working at Boeing. I, for one, work for much more than a paycheck; I think it's reasonable to think they do too. You could argue that it was at the front of their minds before these accidents, but IMO that conclusion only stands in confirmation of some bias against large corporations (which apparently is pretty common!)
- toomuchtodo 8y agoWhat is more likely? That Boeing is genuinely sorry for their enormous process failures (that others on HN have documented in great detail) to catch these product deficiencies earlier in the process, failures that have killed hundreds of people? Or the catastrophic financial losses they will suffer in the event they are forced to scrap the MAX? I'm cynical because of Occam's razor, not because I want to be. I'd very much prefer not to be cynical, to tell you the truth.
- sundvor 8y agoI read that statement as the share price being the only thing on their minds. (Did not explicitly exonerate the pilots.)
- Aloha 8y agoWould you throw out your computer because of a bad hardware driver? This is effectively a software issue, that will eventually be solved
- spwmoni 8y agoIf my computer had killed hundreds of people, yes, I would throw it out, even if the manufacturer promised to fix it.
- gpm 8y agoThis is a hardware issue. Lack of redundancy in sensors. Lack of knobs to turn MCAS off without turning off the electric motors that are apparently necessary to control the plane in challenging circumstances (which a hardware failure can put you in). It's also a training issue, especially with the first flight pilots not being informed about this system. Maybe it can be worked around via software changes and human training. But the software appears to have done what it was supposed to.
- cjbprime 8y agoEvery MAX already had two AoA vanes, MCAS just wasn't hooked up to both in software.
- gpm 8y agoYes, two. The standard for critical systems is 3. Two isn't good for much, if they give different readings you don't know which to believe. Either that kills you like in real life, or it kills you because of the stall problem it was invented to fix. Edit: And yes, you could do something more sensible than what they did, but that doesn't "fix" the issue, it merely mitigates it to some extent.
- cjbprime 8y agoThis seems a little overstated. As I understand it the plane isn't actually aerodynamically unstable and isn't going to stall itself without the pilot pulling into it. The main issue seems to have been software to me. I'm not saying they should avoid using a third sensor. It sounds like a good idea. But I'm not sure it's required for airworthiness, after you move from one to two.