> This is extremely well documented by Boeing going back decades, and it presents solutions of either: 1) reengaging the electronic stabilizer trim and trimming

> This is extremely well documented by Boeing going back decades, and it presents solutions of either: 1) reengaging the electronic stabilizer trim and trimming electronically back to a point where the forces are manageable, then cutting electronic trim again, or 2) relaxing the stick, letting the nose go the way the stabilizers want it to, which slackens the force, and makes cranking the wheel manually doable. Great if you're stabilizers are trimmed severely nose down at a height of 40,000 feet; less great at a height of 1,000 feet. They went for option 1 in this case, with the MCAS kicking in 5 seconds later. > This all seems to add up to Boeing's narrative of "The MCAS is safe, pilots just need to know to hit the stab trim cutout" being grossly insufficient. Yeah, and even that is understating it in my opinion.