3 ms·
Yes and no. Yes, the sensor is appropriate for use as an input to a safety critical system. No, it is not appropriate for a safety critical system to behave i
by salawat 8y ago
Yes and no.
Yes, the sensor is appropriate for use as an input to a safety critical system.
No, it is not appropriate for a safety critical system to behave in such a manner where if that one vane failed, to kill everyone on board.
While the sensor caused the cascade via it's input, it was the implementation of the listening system that allowed the rest to happen.
Safety critical systems are designed with graceful degradation in mind. The fewer sources of information the system has, the more conservative it's contribution to the overall state of the system should become.
There should have been integration with the second AoA sensor, pilot notification of disagree, and a lessening of the authority of the system in favor of the pilots.
The pilots could then have turned the plane around, and landed it.
Boeing is also on the hook for not highlighting the compounding risk presented by an airspeed unreliable failure compared with a stab trim runaway.
I'd also wager they should have had an MCAS disable separate from the stab trim cutout as a result.