I thought this was a software failure initially, but upon following the case, I have come to realize it's not. I still see plenty of people saying this is a so

I thought this was a software failure initially, but upon following the case, I have come to realize it's not. I still see plenty of people saying this is a software failure in this thread. This is not a software failure. This is a system/process failure on many level. The plane was rushed to beat a competitor. A mismatch between the plane & engine happened which can cause it to be off balance. A system was added in place to correct it, but this system only used one sensor instead of 2. The display could have displayed angle of attack which is a safety gauge, but it's optional and was charged for. $80k on a $120 million plane. It's now standard. The display could also display a disagree light if the 2 sensors disagree, but that is also an optional feature, which will now be made standard. The MCSA was only suppose to adjust for .5 degrees and when Boeing & FAA worked together, this was the agreed parameter, but Boeing changed it after the fact to I believe 2.5 and never informed the FAA. FAA only discovered this after the Lion crash. This new system was not documented. It was not in the flight manual or training. Boeing lied to pilots when they asked if there's any new system they should know about. FAA wasn't through in certification process and allowed Boeing to sign off some things themselves. The failure was on so many levels it's ridiculous. It's a whole collapse of a system. Boeing, FAA, certification, QA, hardware design, etc. If anything I won't even blame the software team much, software has no choice but to rely on the signal it's reading from the sensor if invalid. My concern is that the plane wasn't tested with faulty sensor. A happy path was followed. Testing with faulty sensor data might have shown the tug of war that would have happened between the pilot & plane. All in all, failure is across so many levels, it's terrible.