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I'm an armchair non-expert at best: but shouldn't planes always be controllable by the column so long as the plane is mechanically OK? I.e. max power + pull sti
by alkonaut 8y ago
I'm an armchair non-expert at best: but shouldn't planes always be controllable by the column so long as the plane is mechanically OK? I.e. max power + pull stick should always just take the plane up, regardless of any amount of misconfiguration such as being out-of-trim etc?
Isn't that a reasonable expectation? That is: a pilot in panic at low altitude should never be required to do anything more than he basically can with hands on throttle and stick, to avoid disaster?
- Shank 8y ago> but shouldn't planes always be controllable by the column so long as the plane is mechanically OK? The problem is that you can easily exceed the aircraft flight specifications if you enable unlimited control. If you pull the stick back at max power you can seriously risk the creation of a stall, which is why MCAS exists in the first place. The whole goal Boeing had was to create a safe plane by letting software ensure it was always flying within the safe envelope for mechanical stress. > That is: a pilot in panic at low altitude should never be required to do anything more than he basically can with hands on throttle and stick, to avoid disaster? You would hope this, but what makes the determination that the pilot is at a low altitude? The altimeter tells you where you are in relation to sea level, not the nearest distance to terrain. You could be 10,000 feet above sea level but only 1,000 above a mountain. There's a lot of sensor data you'd have to take into account if you were to try to enable a higher degree of control based on how safe/dangerous it is to give that control.
- hammock 8y ago>what makes the determination that the pilot is at a low altitude? Give the pilot an emergency override button and let him make the judgment call. The whole point of parent comment is that too many sensors and software have removed the pilot's final discretion over the aircraft.
- drunken-serval 8y ago> You would hope this, but what makes the determination that the pilot is at a low altitude Radar altimeter. Any aircraft with autoland capability should have three of them.
- CaptainZapp 8y agoThe problem is that you can easily exceed the aircraft flight specifications if you enable unlimited control. If you pull the stick back at max power you can seriously risk the creation of a stall, which is why MCAS exists in the first place. That's manifestly wrong. MCAS was introduced because of the design decision to place the larger and more powerfull power plants further in front and higher up. The reason for this was that Boeing wanted to grandfather the 737 certification into this model and wanted to avoid pilot retraining in the simulator, which was an important sales argument. The problem with this redesign was that the airframe tended to point the nose up, since its aerodynamical characteristics changed due to the redesign. MCAS was introduced in order to simulate the same behavioral characteristics of the older 737s. This is proven by the fact that the system was neither documented nor was it part of the scenarios in the 737 MAX simulator. The idea was that the functionality is completely transparent to the pilots so that the could fly the new plane after a minimal presentation on an iPad, which was less thank one hour if they were already 737 certified. The problem was not pilots pulling the nose too high. The problem, which MCAS tried to correct was the tendency of the plane to pull the nose high and correct for it. Boeing tried to cram a 50 year old airframe into a new plane with engines too big to fit that airframe and wanted to avoid recertification and retraining. That's the whole issue we're discussing here. edit: clarification
- Shank 8y ago> The problem with this redesign was that the airframe tended to point the nose up, since its aerodynamical characteristics changed due to the redesign. Alas, I do appreciate your comment. This is what I was attempting (but failing) to say.
- cmurf 8y ago>MCAS was introduced in order to simulate the same behavioral characteristics of the older 737s. Sounds plausible, but something with the story is still super screwy because a nose down "push" every 15 seconds is nothing like older 737 approach to stall behavior. If the idea is you want the same stick forces at approach to stall as 737NG, then you need some kind of motor or brake in the yoke mechanics to simulate it on a MAX. If it were really simulating the 737NG stick forces, and this were erroneously triggered in an appropriate angle of attack state, the pilot would simply be getting weird/unexpected control stick forces - rather than a fight to the death, possibly at low altitude. And if that simulation were to fail when needed (real high angle of attack), well yeah you're fucked if it's a necessary simulation to help the pilot avoid a developed stall. But at least in that case I would expect even slightly delayed recovery from stall is a better scenario than forcing the nose down. I just don't like this feature pretty much as designed when working, when it's disabled, and when it's confused. It all smells like bullshit. Now I could easily be wrong and it's actually duck farts. But something stinks. I don't see how it gets around either FAR 25 airworthiness certification requirements, because it can be disabled. Or around FAR 61.31 type rating requirement, because it can be disabled. Disable it, and now your airplane is not airworthy and your pilot possibly not suitably type rated? Come on.
- mhandley 8y agoTrim is much more important in a large jet than it is in a Cessna because of the speed range it operates over. At lower speeds with flaps up, you need a high angle of attack to maintain altitude. This entails a very high stick load in a manual aircraft like a 737 unless you trim nose-up for it. With flaps down, you need much less angle of attack, so less nose-up trim. At higher speeds, flaps up, you need a low angle of attack, so trimmed much further down. At higher speeds still, you start to get mach tuck, and need to trim up a little. So that's quite a large range of angle of attack, and so trimming needs to be very effective. Now, at the same time, the airframe is not rated for aerobatics. So, you don't want to fit a huge elevator, because then it would be too easy to pull high-G maneouvers, and damage the airframe. It's all a compromise - very effective trim is a necessity in a large jet, and the elevator should be just large enough to give the control needed. The limitation then is that there may be parts of the flight envelope where the aircraft can be so far out of trim that the elevator struggles to overcome the trim. Normally well trained pilots would go nowhere near these parts of the flight envelope. This is why it's really not helpful when the automatics go awry, and put you there.
- cmurf 8y agoShort answer: it's complicated. But there's this small detail of more accidents in the past than in the present. Without doing a breakdown, this is due to better and more reliable components, better and more reliable pilot training (including CRM), and better and more reliable safeguards provided by computer automation. In your example, max power + pull stick does almost always take the plane up. Pull back more, rate of climb increases. Pull back more, rate of climb increases. Pull back more, and rate of climb decreases. Pull back more, and you're no longer climbing. Pull back more, and you're sinking. Pull back more, and you crash. So... what went wrong? A pilot induced unrecoverable stall spin. The only inexpensive way of prevention is training. A more expensive system will place safeguards: stick shaker, or in fly by wire flat out ignore nose up input when approaching the critical angle of attack. So that means such systems must know about angle of attack, and that in effect a computer can second guess pilot inputs in certain cases. And that ship has sailed a while ago. For a few decades now, incident and accident response always includes discussions of "add another button, add another indicator, add another software routine" to add more protections. As far as I'm aware, the pilot is trained about all of those safeguards. How the plane behaves with them. How the plane behaves without them. What makes me angry about MCAS is not the single fail point (which I leave up to engineers to fight over) but the lack of training. In the working case, at high angle of attack, this thing is going to cause the plane to exhibit a completely different behavior than prior 737s. It's going to do this rather odd duck nose down push every 10-15 seconds or whatever it is, in addition to stick shaker? That is not aerodynamic abstraction by software. That's like a silent flight instructor who just pushes on the yoke every 15 seconds for no goddamn reason. At first it will seem transient until you pick up on the pattern. And I can turn that shit off? I should know about the consequences of turning it off! There are consequences with it on, and off, and if it's confused! I need at least three kinds of training on this new feature. I'd love to see this iPad difference training program, and go through this specific part of that training. Or even if a 737 pilot has made a youtube video of that training. Me: pilot < 1000 hours total flight time, ex-flight instructor, and maybe 20 minutes of 737 sim time in a full motion sim that you get to record as actual flight time in your log book, which is fun to say but does not add to my credibility!