3 ms·

The software did what it was supposed to, the issue was the specification necessitated by the design change.

sundvor 8y ago
Yep, the issues started way earlier than the software. In fact the software is at the very end of the chain here, unless you also want to insert "no training". It all started when they wanted those big engines crammed into an airframe not designed to hold them, so as to try to quickly catch up to shifting market demands being met by Airbus.
- cdolan 8y ago
  How can you say “no training” caused this second crash after reading the article? Did you read the article?
  - Tor3 8y ago
    (Edited) They had training (and sundvor didn't say otherwise), but still, remember Boeing's decision that little or no re-training for the Max was needed for pilots already having 737 training. See e.g. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/22/politics/boeing-737-manual/index.html https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/22/politics/boeing-737-manua...
    - sundvor 8y ago
      Thanks, that was what I was referring to. Cheers.
  - tremon 8y ago
    They said no such thing
  - sundvor 8y ago
    I'm talking about a chain of causes here. There are clearly multiple factors at play.
milgrim 8y ago
I just sounds like nobody really thought about the consequences of MCAS triggering due to faulty AOA sensor input. There should be a dedicated switch to disable MCAS without completely disabling the electric trim motors.
- thg 8y ago
  > I just sounds like nobody really thought about the consequences of MCAS triggering due to faulty AOA sensor input. They did know at least two years before the first crash and decided to not do anything about it. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-regulator-insight-idUSKCN1RA0DP https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-regulat...
  - VBprogrammer 8y ago
    That article is terrible. It's a complete mischaracterisation of what it's sources actually said wrapped up in an attempt to make it relevant to the current MCAS drama.
nl 8y ago
The software did what it was supposed to I'm pretty sure that it's a reasonable assumption that an implies requirement of any type of aircraft control software is "don't fly the aircraft into the ground"
taneq 8y ago
This sort of buck passing is what kills people. The software may have performed according to its specification but it didn't do what it was supposed to, or it wouldn't have crashed the plane. Now sure, we could identify where things went awry in the chain of steps from "make the plane fly right" to a detailed functional spec, but when it comes down to it, the software was meant to "make the plane fly right" and it did not.

Yep, the issues started way earlier than the software. In fact the software is at the very end of the chain here, unless you also want to insert "no training". It all started when they wanted those big engines crammed into an airframe not designed to hold them, so as to try to quickly catch up to shifting market demands being met by Airbus.

cdolan 8y ago
How can you say “no training” caused this second crash after reading the article? Did you read the article?
- Tor3 8y ago
  (Edited) They had training (and sundvor didn't say otherwise), but still, remember Boeing's decision that little or no re-training for the Max was needed for pilots already having 737 training. See e.g. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/22/politics/boeing-737-manual/index.html https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/22/politics/boeing-737-manua...
  - sundvor 8y ago
    Thanks, that was what I was referring to. Cheers.
- tremon 8y ago
  They said no such thing
- sundvor 8y ago
  I'm talking about a chain of causes here. There are clearly multiple factors at play.

milgrim 8y ago

I just sounds like nobody really thought about the consequences of MCAS triggering due to faulty AOA sensor input. There should be a dedicated switch to disable MCAS without completely disabling the electric trim motors.

thg 8y ago
> I just sounds like nobody really thought about the consequences of MCAS triggering due to faulty AOA sensor input. They did know at least two years before the first crash and decided to not do anything about it. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-regulator-insight-idUSKCN1RA0DP https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-regulat...
- VBprogrammer 8y ago
  That article is terrible. It's a complete mischaracterisation of what it's sources actually said wrapped up in an attempt to make it relevant to the current MCAS drama.

nl 8y ago

The software did what it was supposed to I'm pretty sure that it's a reasonable assumption that an implies requirement of any type of aircraft control software is "don't fly the aircraft into the ground"

taneq 8y ago

This sort of buck passing is what kills people. The software may have performed according to its specification but it didn't do what it was supposed to, or it wouldn't have crashed the plane. Now sure, we could identify where things went awry in the chain of steps from "make the plane fly right" to a detailed functional spec, but when it comes down to it, the software was meant to "make the plane fly right" and it did not.