6 ms·

This is a software screwup. It's buggy software due to rush to market. I hope they do an analysis of the whole project. We can all learn from it.

GrumpyNl 8y ago
At the cost of 300 lives.
bobcostas55 8y ago
The software did what it was supposed to, the issue was the specification necessitated by the design change.
- sundvor 8y ago
  Yep, the issues started way earlier than the software. In fact the software is at the very end of the chain here, unless you also want to insert "no training". It all started when they wanted those big engines crammed into an airframe not designed to hold them, so as to try to quickly catch up to shifting market demands being met by Airbus.
  - cdolan 8y ago
    How can you say “no training” caused this second crash after reading the article? Did you read the article?
    - Tor3 8y ago
      (Edited) They had training (and sundvor didn't say otherwise), but still, remember Boeing's decision that little or no re-training for the Max was needed for pilots already having 737 training. See e.g. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/22/politics/boeing-737-manual/index.html https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/22/politics/boeing-737-manua...
      - sundvor 8y ago
        Thanks, that was what I was referring to. Cheers.
    - tremon 8y ago
      They said no such thing
    - sundvor 8y ago
      I'm talking about a chain of causes here. There are clearly multiple factors at play.
- milgrim 8y ago
  I just sounds like nobody really thought about the consequences of MCAS triggering due to faulty AOA sensor input. There should be a dedicated switch to disable MCAS without completely disabling the electric trim motors.
  - thg 8y ago
    > I just sounds like nobody really thought about the consequences of MCAS triggering due to faulty AOA sensor input. They did know at least two years before the first crash and decided to not do anything about it. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-regulator-insight-idUSKCN1RA0DP https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-regulat...
    - VBprogrammer 8y ago
      That article is terrible. It's a complete mischaracterisation of what it's sources actually said wrapped up in an attempt to make it relevant to the current MCAS drama.
- nl 8y ago
  The software did what it was supposed to I'm pretty sure that it's a reasonable assumption that an implies requirement of any type of aircraft control software is "don't fly the aircraft into the ground"
- taneq 8y ago
  This sort of buck passing is what kills people. The software may have performed according to its specification but it didn't do what it was supposed to, or it wouldn't have crashed the plane. Now sure, we could identify where things went awry in the chain of steps from "make the plane fly right" to a detailed functional spec, but when it comes down to it, the software was meant to "make the plane fly right" and it did not.
quickthrower2 8y ago
Not really, see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19570691 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19570691 for a good analysis
Tor3 8y ago
It's worse than that. When they refitted the 737 with newer, larger engines to create the 737 Max there wasn't enough room, so they were shifted forwards (look at the pictures - the engines are almost in front of the wings). This created a setup where the thrust could make the plane pitch up in certain cituations - the system isn't in balance anymore. Thus the sensor to detect pitch-up and the software to try to compensate for that. A hack to fix a hack. The whole airplane should be redesigned to balance as an 'old' 737. I for one won't set my feet in any 737 Max, whatever software or sensor upgrades they put in. No way.
- dingaling 8y ago
  > This created a setup where the trust could make the plane pitch up No, not related to thrust. All underwing-engined airliners pitch with thrust. I wish we could stamp out this falsehoid. The nacelles added aerodynamic effects at high AoA.
  - Tor3 8y ago
    Pointing only at thrust is probably inaccurate, I agree. However, several sources point to the shifted center of gravity as a cause of the pitch, not just aerodynamic effects. For example an analyst at Leeham Co. (https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-boeing-737-max-crash-explainer-20181116-story.html https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-boeing-737-max-crash-...)
chungleong 8y ago
Definitely a software QA issue. People are blaming the engines but we couldn't have known, a priori, that software is incapable of compensating for the change in balance. Process should have been in place preventing the delivery of an inadequate solution.
dredmorbius 8y ago
Software is involved, yes, but the problems are ultimately of management, risks (both underestimated and externalised on airlines, pilots, passengers, and the public), cutting corners, and complexity debt.

GrumpyNl 8y ago

At the cost of 300 lives.

bobcostas55 8y ago

The software did what it was supposed to, the issue was the specification necessitated by the design change.

sundvor 8y ago
Yep, the issues started way earlier than the software. In fact the software is at the very end of the chain here, unless you also want to insert "no training". It all started when they wanted those big engines crammed into an airframe not designed to hold them, so as to try to quickly catch up to shifting market demands being met by Airbus.
- cdolan 8y ago
  How can you say “no training” caused this second crash after reading the article? Did you read the article?
  - Tor3 8y ago
    (Edited) They had training (and sundvor didn't say otherwise), but still, remember Boeing's decision that little or no re-training for the Max was needed for pilots already having 737 training. See e.g. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/22/politics/boeing-737-manual/index.html https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/22/politics/boeing-737-manua...
    - sundvor 8y ago
      Thanks, that was what I was referring to. Cheers.
  - tremon 8y ago
    They said no such thing
  - sundvor 8y ago
    I'm talking about a chain of causes here. There are clearly multiple factors at play.
milgrim 8y ago
I just sounds like nobody really thought about the consequences of MCAS triggering due to faulty AOA sensor input. There should be a dedicated switch to disable MCAS without completely disabling the electric trim motors.
- thg 8y ago
  > I just sounds like nobody really thought about the consequences of MCAS triggering due to faulty AOA sensor input. They did know at least two years before the first crash and decided to not do anything about it. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-regulator-insight-idUSKCN1RA0DP https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-regulat...
  - VBprogrammer 8y ago
    That article is terrible. It's a complete mischaracterisation of what it's sources actually said wrapped up in an attempt to make it relevant to the current MCAS drama.
nl 8y ago
The software did what it was supposed to I'm pretty sure that it's a reasonable assumption that an implies requirement of any type of aircraft control software is "don't fly the aircraft into the ground"
taneq 8y ago
This sort of buck passing is what kills people. The software may have performed according to its specification but it didn't do what it was supposed to, or it wouldn't have crashed the plane. Now sure, we could identify where things went awry in the chain of steps from "make the plane fly right" to a detailed functional spec, but when it comes down to it, the software was meant to "make the plane fly right" and it did not.

quickthrower2 8y ago

Not really, see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19570691 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19570691 for a good analysis

Tor3 8y ago

It's worse than that. When they refitted the 737 with newer, larger engines to create the 737 Max there wasn't enough room, so they were shifted forwards (look at the pictures - the engines are almost in front of the wings). This created a setup where the thrust could make the plane pitch up in certain cituations - the system isn't in balance anymore. Thus the sensor to detect pitch-up and the software to try to compensate for that. A hack to fix a hack. The whole airplane should be redesigned to balance as an 'old' 737. I for one won't set my feet in any 737 Max, whatever software or sensor upgrades they put in. No way.

dingaling 8y ago
> This created a setup where the trust could make the plane pitch up No, not related to thrust. All underwing-engined airliners pitch with thrust. I wish we could stamp out this falsehoid. The nacelles added aerodynamic effects at high AoA.
- Tor3 8y ago
  Pointing only at thrust is probably inaccurate, I agree. However, several sources point to the shifted center of gravity as a cause of the pitch, not just aerodynamic effects. For example an analyst at Leeham Co. (https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-boeing-737-max-crash-explainer-20181116-story.html https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-boeing-737-max-crash-...)

chungleong 8y ago

Definitely a software QA issue. People are blaming the engines but we couldn't have known, a priori, that software is incapable of compensating for the change in balance. Process should have been in place preventing the delivery of an inadequate solution.

dredmorbius 8y ago

Software is involved, yes, but the problems are ultimately of management, risks (both underestimated and externalised on airlines, pilots, passengers, and the public), cutting corners, and complexity debt.