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I really loathe the fact that I can't just enroll 3 Yubikeys (or the equivalent) for an employee (1 to be used, 1 for backup, and 1 extra in case the backup fai
by bsder 8y ago
I really loathe the fact that I can't just enroll 3 Yubikeys (or the equivalent) for an employee (1 to be used, 1 for backup, and 1 extra in case the backup fails) and be done with security for everything.
I'm not even requesting that I as the issuer be able to subordinate those keys. Just make them work without making me want to shoot anyone who mentions the word "security".
The security folks whine that nobody does security, but they sure don't make it very easy to do so when someone wants to.
- jrockway 8y agoWe had a very good system at Google and I think there are papers floating around about how it worked. You authenticated once per day per machine, and occasionally privileged operations would require human presence detection by pressing the security key. ssh, web... everything, all integrated. I wish we had the same system at my current job, but alas, much programming would be required. I believe Google sells a product, the "identity aware proxy", that is very much like what existed internally. I haven't used it, so am unsure. But it sounds great.
- YawningAngel 8y agoWe use both Google Cloud Platform and the Identity Aware Proxy, with Google as our sole identity provider. One login + hardware token gets you onto ssh, k8s and web endpoints, which is pretty great. There are a lot of rough edges that make it pretty janky to administer though.
- bsder 8y ago> There are a lot of rough edges that make it pretty janky to administer though. That pretty much describes every security token system I have ever seen. Sadly.
- cvwright 8y agoSounds like you're talking about BeyondCorp? https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/44860.pdf https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.c...
- bduerst 8y agoAFAIK, it's part of the BeyondCorp initiative, which started as a way to give trusted access to devices on untrusted IPs. GP here is talking about the individual hardware dongles that are make the feat possible today: https://www.businessinsider.com/none-of-googles-employees-get-phished-because-of-yubikey-security-key-2018-7 https://www.businessinsider.com/none-of-googles-employees-ge...