6 ms·

Boeing deserves to get nailed for this. You can't tell me they didn't know it was the MCAS at fault after the first crash 6 months ago, and decided to do...noth

Boeing deserves to get nailed for this. You can't tell me they didn't know it was the MCAS at fault after the first crash 6 months ago, and decided to do...nothing.

all_blue_chucks 8y ago
From a legal standpoint, shipping a "fix" could be used as evidence of guilt, though.
- hangonhn 8y ago
  Things like that is why we have such insane damages dollar amounts for punitive damage. People reward huge punitive damages since the Ford Pinto case to compel companies to "do the right thing" because if you don't and you're found guilty, the punitive damage can be many times what the original cost would have been.
  - jgust 8y ago
    I've been saying that software engineering as an industry is in the caveman state of development. The amount of scrutiny that production software gets at _most_ companies is hilariously lacking compared to say, a civil engineering blueprint and there are virtually zero repercussions for failure or negligence. Compare the education & certification required to be called a civil engineer vs. a software engineer and you'll notice that the industry is basically the wild west. You could also argue that computer science isn't yet a "hard science" like mechanical, civil, chemical, etc. engineering are. I predict that there will be a split in the industry between "software engineer" and "software laborer" where there are specific certifications you need to have before being called an "engineer". "Software engineers" will be held responsible, like civil engineers are, for mistakes that result in accidents. Companies that write safety critical software like auto, air, and space industries where human lives or huge $$$ are on the line will hire engineers, e-commerce companies will continue to hire "code laborers". Maybe they will even give you a fancy ring to wear?
    - natalyarostova 8y ago
      It just depends on the cost of a mistake, you don't need people trained at that level for web dev. I can do data science coding, but I wouldn't trust myself to write Anything where failure could kill someone.
      - xiphias2 8y ago
        A person should never be trusted for this. Airplanes are more reliable because the processes (and tech) are improving, not the people. The problem here was that the process got too expensive, so Boeing was pressured into skipping it.
        natalyarostova 8y ago
        I get your point, and I agree largely, but there is still some element of the people. I wouldn't want someone like myself, who is trained on python and self-taught, to be responsible for any of these components.
    - ams6110 8y ago
      The software that runs safety-critical flight controls is actually developed nothing like typical ecommerce or social media. It is designed and developed to an engineering standard. You can review DO-178C requirements[1]. Not all software has the same consequences for failure. The highest level is when failure is catastrophic, i.e. "Failure may cause deaths, usually with loss of the airplane." This requires the highest "Level A" assurance level. Presumably MCAS was not originally evaluated as needing to meet the highest level. If it were, the single AoA input would have immediately disqualified the design right off the bat. There's some speculation that the delays on the "fix" are because if they have to redevelop the software at a "Level A" standard that means basically a complete reimplementation with full tracability of requirements from design to source code through compilation to executable, with independent verification. That won't happen in a few weeks. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DO-178C https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DO-178C
      - 8y ago
- pubutil 8y ago
  This, to me, highlights a deeper issue. The fear of legal ramifications shouldn't get in the way of creating better, safer products. If Boeing is avoiding taking the heat by withholding a fix it may cost more people their lives.
cameldrv 8y ago
They weren't doing nothing. They've been working on a software fix since the Lion Air crash, but it wasn't ready by the time of the Ethiopian crash. The plan was to update some checklists as a stopgap and get new software ASAP. Obviously in hindsight they should have grounded the fleet until the new software was ready. At the time that would have been a very difficult decision to make internally at Boeing, given that the 737MAX has $250 Billion worth of orders, and arguably at the time, the updated checklists made a crash unlikely. This is the situation where an independent regulatory body is most important. The commercial pressure to keep flying was almost irresistable, and you need someone without those commercial pressures to put the brakes on.
- jordache 8y ago
  commercial pressure should have been the liability exposure they find themselves in now.
  - cameldrv 8y ago
    The problem is this: From the CEO's standpoint, grounding the fleet might have cost him his job given that there was a plausible (even though we know now ineffective) checklist based solution to the problem. Another crash might also cost the CEO his job, but that has a probability of less than one. The incentive in this situation is to roll the dice. The problem is that the decision maker does not bear the liability for his actions. He's not the one making a smoking crater in the ground. That's why you need a regulator with different motivations. Historically, the FAA has been exceptionally effective at improving air safety. The Republican/business argument is that they have overdone it and the costs of compliance exceed the benefit at the margin. These accidents are a strong argument otherwise.
- empath75 8y ago
  Or, you know, someone who values human lives more than money.
  - theredbox 8y ago
RandallBrown 8y ago
I read something about how they did have a fix, but the government shutdown prevented it from being deployed in time.
zepearl 8y ago
Focusing & expanding your "deserves": I guess that I agree at least partially with you (even without the 2nd incident, for which no official facts have been presented - but therefore I cannot upvote you as there is no confirmation yet, sorry), thinking about the facts that e.g. MCAS is not intuitive to understand/use for the pilots and that it relies on only 1 sensor (at least the original version) (any other flaw?). About the consequences: I just hope that the whole investigation won't boil down to just some "crazy" engineers that implemented that system because they were having a bad day or had no clue about what they were doing etc... . Top-management must have known (at least implicitly/indirectly) the risks associated to a tight deadline and/or a miracle-like re-engineering of an old airplane and/or not having airplane-hackers available during the re-engineering phase and/or etc... because one of the roles of top management is to ask questions when something out of the ordinary happens especially when A LOT of money is involved. Of course if top-mgmt puts enough pressure to achieve something, no questions will arise from both ends (and here we can probably optimistically go into the area of whistleblowers :) ). I think that the same thing can be applied to Volkswagen (e.g. impossible that some engineer came up with "and here we have a Diesel engine outputting half as much noxious gas as everybody else on the planet" and nobody else asked questions because the mgmt wasn't pressuring those departments to get exactly such results) and other previous scandals.

Boeing deserves to get nailed for this. You can't tell me they didn't know it was the MCAS at fault after the first crash 6 months ago, and decided to do...nothing.

all_blue_chucks 8y ago

From a legal standpoint, shipping a "fix" could be used as evidence of guilt, though.

hangonhn 8y ago
Things like that is why we have such insane damages dollar amounts for punitive damage. People reward huge punitive damages since the Ford Pinto case to compel companies to "do the right thing" because if you don't and you're found guilty, the punitive damage can be many times what the original cost would have been.
- jgust 8y ago
  I've been saying that software engineering as an industry is in the caveman state of development. The amount of scrutiny that production software gets at _most_ companies is hilariously lacking compared to say, a civil engineering blueprint and there are virtually zero repercussions for failure or negligence. Compare the education & certification required to be called a civil engineer vs. a software engineer and you'll notice that the industry is basically the wild west. You could also argue that computer science isn't yet a "hard science" like mechanical, civil, chemical, etc. engineering are. I predict that there will be a split in the industry between "software engineer" and "software laborer" where there are specific certifications you need to have before being called an "engineer". "Software engineers" will be held responsible, like civil engineers are, for mistakes that result in accidents. Companies that write safety critical software like auto, air, and space industries where human lives or huge $$$ are on the line will hire engineers, e-commerce companies will continue to hire "code laborers". Maybe they will even give you a fancy ring to wear?
  - natalyarostova 8y ago
    It just depends on the cost of a mistake, you don't need people trained at that level for web dev. I can do data science coding, but I wouldn't trust myself to write Anything where failure could kill someone.
    - xiphias2 8y ago
      A person should never be trusted for this. Airplanes are more reliable because the processes (and tech) are improving, not the people. The problem here was that the process got too expensive, so Boeing was pressured into skipping it.
      - natalyarostova 8y ago
        I get your point, and I agree largely, but there is still some element of the people. I wouldn't want someone like myself, who is trained on python and self-taught, to be responsible for any of these components.
  - ams6110 8y ago
    The software that runs safety-critical flight controls is actually developed nothing like typical ecommerce or social media. It is designed and developed to an engineering standard. You can review DO-178C requirements[1]. Not all software has the same consequences for failure. The highest level is when failure is catastrophic, i.e. "Failure may cause deaths, usually with loss of the airplane." This requires the highest "Level A" assurance level. Presumably MCAS was not originally evaluated as needing to meet the highest level. If it were, the single AoA input would have immediately disqualified the design right off the bat. There's some speculation that the delays on the "fix" are because if they have to redevelop the software at a "Level A" standard that means basically a complete reimplementation with full tracability of requirements from design to source code through compilation to executable, with independent verification. That won't happen in a few weeks. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DO-178C https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DO-178C
    - 8y ago
pubutil 8y ago
This, to me, highlights a deeper issue. The fear of legal ramifications shouldn't get in the way of creating better, safer products. If Boeing is avoiding taking the heat by withholding a fix it may cost more people their lives.

cameldrv 8y ago

They weren't doing nothing. They've been working on a software fix since the Lion Air crash, but it wasn't ready by the time of the Ethiopian crash. The plan was to update some checklists as a stopgap and get new software ASAP. Obviously in hindsight they should have grounded the fleet until the new software was ready. At the time that would have been a very difficult decision to make internally at Boeing, given that the 737MAX has $250 Billion worth of orders, and arguably at the time, the updated checklists made a crash unlikely. This is the situation where an independent regulatory body is most important. The commercial pressure to keep flying was almost irresistable, and you need someone without those commercial pressures to put the brakes on.

jordache 8y ago
commercial pressure should have been the liability exposure they find themselves in now.
- cameldrv 8y ago
  The problem is this: From the CEO's standpoint, grounding the fleet might have cost him his job given that there was a plausible (even though we know now ineffective) checklist based solution to the problem. Another crash might also cost the CEO his job, but that has a probability of less than one. The incentive in this situation is to roll the dice. The problem is that the decision maker does not bear the liability for his actions. He's not the one making a smoking crater in the ground. That's why you need a regulator with different motivations. Historically, the FAA has been exceptionally effective at improving air safety. The Republican/business argument is that they have overdone it and the costs of compliance exceed the benefit at the margin. These accidents are a strong argument otherwise.
empath75 8y ago
Or, you know, someone who values human lives more than money.
- theredbox 8y ago

RandallBrown 8y ago

I read something about how they did have a fix, but the government shutdown prevented it from being deployed in time.

zepearl 8y ago

Focusing & expanding your "deserves": I guess that I agree at least partially with you (even without the 2nd incident, for which no official facts have been presented - but therefore I cannot upvote you as there is no confirmation yet, sorry), thinking about the facts that e.g. MCAS is not intuitive to understand/use for the pilots and that it relies on only 1 sensor (at least the original version) (any other flaw?). About the consequences: I just hope that the whole investigation won't boil down to just some "crazy" engineers that implemented that system because they were having a bad day or had no clue about what they were doing etc... . Top-management must have known (at least implicitly/indirectly) the risks associated to a tight deadline and/or a miracle-like re-engineering of an old airplane and/or not having airplane-hackers available during the re-engineering phase and/or etc... because one of the roles of top management is to ask questions when something out of the ordinary happens especially when A LOT of money is involved. Of course if top-mgmt puts enough pressure to achieve something, no questions will arise from both ends (and here we can probably optimistically go into the area of whistleblowers :) ). I think that the same thing can be applied to Volkswagen (e.g. impossible that some engineer came up with "and here we have a Diesel engine outputting half as much noxious gas as everybody else on the planet" and nobody else asked questions because the mgmt wasn't pressuring those departments to get exactly such results) and other previous scandals.