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Automation is not bad per se. What I mean is that there must be an opportunity for human override at all levels of automation (and as seamless as possible) in c

Automation is not bad per se. What I mean is that there must be an opportunity for human override at all levels of automation (and as seamless as possible) in case of machine failure. It does not deny that it could be done by one pilot only, or half a pilot or even somehow a remote human intervention. When designing a critical system such as an aircraft, you must include human authority into it. No technology will ever be 100% foolproof. This is not a stance against technology, automation or innovation, it's a matter of concept : most of systems (and aircraft in particular) are human-machine systems. You cannot design an unoverrideable automatic mechanism. Think of how you can appreciate the capacity of full control over your computer and your OS (happy OpenBSD user here, for the record).

ishan1121 8y ago
>When designing a critical system such as an aircraft, you must include human authority into it This is where Boeing messed up big time. According to the article they only had 2 AoA sensor, completely missing the fact that what happens if one sensor fails and which is correct. Airbus has 3, but IMO a critical component like an AoA sensor there should be 5 + additional inputs from the artificial horizon should be considered. >You cannot design an unoverrideable automatic mechanism. Yes, it makes sense. Even a complete automatic mechanism would need functionality to override in case things go completely haywire.
- magduf 8y ago
  >This is where Boeing messed up big time. According to the article they only had 2 AoA sensor, completely missing the fact that what happens if one sensor fails and which is correct. No, you missed something really critical in all this. There are 2 AoA sensors, however only 1 of them is used as input for the MCAS system. There was no redundancy whatsoever! The proposed software patch will use both AoA sensors, and light an indicator light if they disagree. They don't want to retrofit the planes with 3 sensors like Airbus, because obviously Boeing cares more about profits than safety and good engineering.

ishan1121 8y ago

>When designing a critical system such as an aircraft, you must include human authority into it This is where Boeing messed up big time. According to the article they only had 2 AoA sensor, completely missing the fact that what happens if one sensor fails and which is correct. Airbus has 3, but IMO a critical component like an AoA sensor there should be 5 + additional inputs from the artificial horizon should be considered. >You cannot design an unoverrideable automatic mechanism. Yes, it makes sense. Even a complete automatic mechanism would need functionality to override in case things go completely haywire.

magduf 8y ago
>This is where Boeing messed up big time. According to the article they only had 2 AoA sensor, completely missing the fact that what happens if one sensor fails and which is correct. No, you missed something really critical in all this. There are 2 AoA sensors, however only 1 of them is used as input for the MCAS system. There was no redundancy whatsoever! The proposed software patch will use both AoA sensors, and light an indicator light if they disagree. They don't want to retrofit the planes with 3 sensors like Airbus, because obviously Boeing cares more about profits than safety and good engineering.