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> The MCAS implementation was clearly flawed, being vulnerable to a single point of failure in the AoA data I personally find the AoA sensors failure to be unl
by linuxftw 8y ago
> The MCAS implementation was clearly flawed, being vulnerable to a single point of failure in the AoA data
I personally find the AoA sensors failure to be unlikely in the case of the Lion Air crash as they were replaced in between the two problematic flights.
I most interested in seeing the final results of the Ethiopian crash. My suspicion is the MCAS has terrible software and is a bug-ridden mess.
- salawat 8y agoAh, but the flight computer switches which AoA sensor it talks to every time it's booted. If maintenance procedures for testing did not correctly specify that a retest must start, then restart the system to actually test that the repair was successful, then that replacement may have been tested while the computer was being fed data by the correctly operating sensor. They would have had to attempted a single boot between flights for the next flight to have flown with the untested replacement sensor. If they didn't test at all, then it's possible both sensors had a problem. This is of course assuming that there is any retest procedure at all in the documentation given that the AoA sensor wasn't classified as safety-critical. It really seems like the makings of a bad movie doesn't it?