4 ms·
So everybody used to be schizophrenic? I know the bad connotations of schizophrenia are more present in modern societies, but still, I can't see how a primitiv
by raducu 8y ago
So everybody used to be schizophrenic?
I know the bad connotations of schizophrenia are more present in modern societies, but still, I can't see how a primitive group of schizophrenics would be able to thrive.
Is there any proof or actual need for this bicameral mind other than trying to explain the religious phenomenon?
- Taylor_OD 8y agoI understood it to be less like schizophrenia and more like early peoples who were not aware of their internal monologue. Their own thoughts were perceived as the command or voice of Gods because how else would they be able to, "hear" words that were not said by another around them?
- whatshisface 8y agoIt's beyond me how you could ever show evidence for that, beyond reading between the lines of ancient text (which we know is one of the least reliable forms of historical evidence ever invented).
- nitrogen 8y agoThis isn't evidence, but I used to be religious and there was a certain religious mindset in which the internal monologue became more like an internal dialogue. Given this, and that IIRC there is a part of the brain that has been associated with religious experience, the bicameral mind seems at least plausible, though maybe not exactly as originally posited.
- photojosh 8y agoI posted a similar comment above on how religious approaches give bicameral theory some plausibility: people genuinely do think God talks to them, even today. [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19567926 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19567926
- ionised 8y agoBut they would have evolved with that inner monologue. It's not like it would be this strange thing to them. I was born with the inner monologue. I wasn't told by others what it was, I figured it out for myself. It's me. I'm not my body, I am the voice inside my head, looking out through the eyes of a body that is nothing but a vessel for a genetic code.
- dllthomas 8y ago> I was born with the inner monologue. Are you sure? It seems very unlikely that it would predate language acquisition by much, at least in the form I experience.
- ionised 8y agoI wouldn't say my inner monologue is speaking to me in my native language. That's just how my conscious mind tries to interpret it. I can 'think' without speaking to myself internally. My 'inner monologue' doesn't always express itself in words. I think people are reading too much into the 'monologue' part and ascribing too many actual conversational qualities to it.
- Taylor_OD 8y ago> I think people are reading too much into the 'monologue' part and ascribing too many actual conversational qualities to it. You're also making assessments of how other peoples minds work without having any perspective outside how your own works. My monologue is fairly conversational. I also don't need to be thinking, "out loud" to think. That seems like it would be incredibly slow. Much of my day to day doesn't require active thinking. However, my internal monologue comes in when I've got a meaty problem to work over. It's like talking the idea out with another person.
- dllthomas 8y agoIt probably varies between people, both actual experience and interpretation. I find that I have a very verbal "stream of consciousness" which I would label my "inner monologue" but which certainly doesn't constitute all of my thinking.
- lukifer 8y agoWho says we're not "schizophrenic" now? Our common parlance attributes agency to blind chaotic forces in the universe; our visual systems are quasi-hallucinogenic in their mechanisms (making all sorts of "optical illusion" mistakes); and while we like to think we're singular, holistically consistent beings, our actual behavior is often better described by nested (and competitive) sub-agent neuron clusters: https://meltingasphalt.com/neurons-gone-wild/ https://meltingasphalt.com/neurons-gone-wild/ It's worth considering that Jaynes' argument has as much to do with language as religion, positing a tightly coupled relationship between (spoken) language and subjective consciousness/qualia. "Gods" were in part an explanatory mechanism for the same phenomena of consciousness and (feeling of) decision-making that we experience today, which we now explain via "Self" narratives. In other words: rainbows, and our experience of them, did not fundamentally change, only our social stories about rainbows (God's Covenant -> Light Refraction). Assuming one accepts a relationship between consciousness and language, it's also worth considering that language is a socially viral phenomenon, and so it makes sense that we might externalize consciousness explanations into a social space, via the common knowledge of our community's tribal gods, or a shared animist experience of nature. The innovation of the Self is a relatively recent one in this model; and even then, each of us frequently make the mistake of modeling other Selves after our own Self (the only god the secular world honors), resulting in biases like the Curse of Knowledge. At any rate, Jaynes' argument is quite detailed and thorough, and difficult to make concisely. I found "Origins of Consciousness" to be a thought-provoking read, but I'm still not sure I'm willing to stake a strong claim For or Against the model.