Deploying the attack presented in this thesis requires not only having access to a TEE but also compromising one of the parties to a communication Essentially

Deploying the attack presented in this thesis requires not only having access to a TEE but also compromising one of the parties to a communication Essentially everyone with a PC has access to TEEs: beyond Intel SGX there's also the traditional static root of trust mechanism, which suffices for this, and also voids the paper's proposed solution; indeed the paper recognises that given a certain kind of TEE there appear to be no solutions. As for 'compromising one the parties', the point of deniability implemented cryptographically is that your counterparty in the conversation could encrypt messages such that you can't tell who encrypted them, i.e. an encrypted chat log could have been forged. So the adversary is the person you're talking to: they're already 'compromised'.