4 ms·

Seems like in the U.S. the pilots are properly trained and are capable of handling the difference in the new vs old aircraft. Other countries aren't fairing so

Seems like in the U.S. the pilots are properly trained and are capable of handling the difference in the new vs old aircraft. Other countries aren't fairing so well. Is this a failing of the U.S. Government's FAA? No. I have a good friend who was a Naval aviator and did crash investigations for the Navy, his ordered list for causes of aviation crashes. The top 3 causes he believes are responsible for 99.9% of all crashes. 1. Pilot error due to fatigue (Which the U.S. has made strides to drastically reduce) 2. Pilot error not due to fatigue 3. Pilot lack of training 4. Plane failure (hardware, software, mechanical, etc)

cmurf 8y ago
>Seems like in the U.S. the pilots are properly trained and are capable of handling the difference in the new vs old aircraft.Other countries aren't fairing so well. What specific difference training did U.S. pilots receive that foreign pilots did not? How are pilots in other countries improperly trained? What is the evidence either 737 MAX crash had anything to do with training? If better training can mitigate flawed design, should that absolve any portion of manufacturer liability for any discovered flawed design? In a proper investigation, all bias must be removed, and that includes statistical likelihood of prior causes of crashes.
- DuskStar 8y ago
  > What specific difference training did U.S. pilots receive that foreign pilots did not? Well, they all have far more than 200 hours of flight time, for one. Even the copilots. > What is the evidence either 737 MAX crash had anything to do with training? The fact that the problem was displayed to the pilots (trim severely out of norm) and they didn't follow the correction procedures properly. Though that might not be "training" as much as "competence". > If better training can mitigate flawed design, should that absolve any portion of manufacturer liability for any discovered flawed design? Really depends on the flaw.
  - cmurf 8y ago
    The pilots of Lion Air 610 had in excess of 5000 hours. Flight experience doesn't answer the question I asked either. The assertion was made that U.S. pilots received difference training (NG vs MAX). What difference training? You assume without evidence the problem manifests like runaway trim. And then proceed to assume without evidence the incompetency of two pilots. And yet you refuse to assume the incompetency of the automation, which didn't mere fail, it countermanded with lethal force the 100% correct control inputs of the pilots. The idea they have to assert their sanity by flipping two switches, is about as ridiculous as automation not having to assert its sanity when it, by design, trusts a single point of failure one upping that by trusting it while it's failing and one upping that to extreme by taking action on it without any regard to other input sources including the pilots themselves. It's beyond obscene to me. I have personally trained private pilots with competency at identifying failed gauges, knowing which one to disregard, and estimating the missing values by inference from the remaining gauges. And this is in sub-200 hour pilots. The skill required for the instrument rating exceeds this particular automation in the AOA failure case by quite a lot. And the skill required for commercial and ATP ratings is even greater than that by quite a lot. Meanwhile MCAS upset from judgement of a single sensor induced such an unusual attitude it became unrecoverable. So the assumption of incompetency by pilots, while cutting automation all kinds of slack is to me 180 degrees backwards.
    - DuskStar 8y ago
      I think I misread difference training as different training there, my apologies. And the Ethiopian Air copilot had ~200 total hours, thus the comment. > You assume without evidence the problem manifests like runaway trim. And then proceed to assume without evidence the incompetency of two pilots. And yet you refuse to assume the incompetency of the automation, which didn't mere fail, it countermanded with lethal force the 100% correct control inputs of the pilots. The idea they have to assert their sanity by flipping two switches, is about as ridiculous as automation not having to assert its sanity when it, by design, trusts a single point of failure one upping that by trusting it while it's failing and one upping that to extreme by taking action on it without any regard to other input sources including the pilots themselves. It's beyond obscene to me. I didn't say that it manifests like runaway trim. I said that it manifests as "severely outside the norm trim", which it most certainly does. Unless you're saying that full nose down trim is normal? As for "asserting incompetence without evidence", they're certainly less competent than pilot #3 on the Lion Air flight the night before. (since, you know, that guy realized what was going on and how to resolve it) As for the automation being incompetent, yep you're right! It is! But airplane crashes don't happen for one reason - not commercial flights at least. They happen when a sequence of failures occurs, just like here. Boeing failed to consider the worst case behavior of MCAS, Lion Air maintenance fucked up, and the Lion Air pilots weren't able to diagnose the failure that morning. (The failure pipeline of the Ethiopian crash is still to be determined) As for why Boeing failed there... It's at least partly because the automatic trim controls weren't considered a safety critical part, since they had multiply redundant backups. It's just that the backups were "turn off electronic trim" and "grab the trim wheel and hold it in place", both of which require pilot action. (Allowing stuff like this to get grandfathered in is arguably a hole in the FAA's systems) > I have personally trained private pilots with competency at identifying failed gauges, knowing which one to disregard, and estimating the missing values by inference from the remaining gauges. And this is in sub-200 hour pilots. The skill required for the instrument rating exceeds this particular automation in the AOA failure case by quite a lot. And the skill required for commercial and ATP ratings is even greater than that by quite a lot. Meanwhile MCAS upset from judgement of a single sensor induced such an unusual attitude it became unrecoverable. Well then why was the issue so difficult for the pilots to diagnose here? There's a gauge for trim, and I'd hope it would be looked at when trying to figure out why you have to keep pulling back on the yoke so hard.

cmurf 8y ago

>Seems like in the U.S. the pilots are properly trained and are capable of handling the difference in the new vs old aircraft.Other countries aren't fairing so well. What specific difference training did U.S. pilots receive that foreign pilots did not? How are pilots in other countries improperly trained? What is the evidence either 737 MAX crash had anything to do with training? If better training can mitigate flawed design, should that absolve any portion of manufacturer liability for any discovered flawed design? In a proper investigation, all bias must be removed, and that includes statistical likelihood of prior causes of crashes.

DuskStar 8y ago
> What specific difference training did U.S. pilots receive that foreign pilots did not? Well, they all have far more than 200 hours of flight time, for one. Even the copilots. > What is the evidence either 737 MAX crash had anything to do with training? The fact that the problem was displayed to the pilots (trim severely out of norm) and they didn't follow the correction procedures properly. Though that might not be "training" as much as "competence". > If better training can mitigate flawed design, should that absolve any portion of manufacturer liability for any discovered flawed design? Really depends on the flaw.
- cmurf 8y ago
  The pilots of Lion Air 610 had in excess of 5000 hours. Flight experience doesn't answer the question I asked either. The assertion was made that U.S. pilots received difference training (NG vs MAX). What difference training? You assume without evidence the problem manifests like runaway trim. And then proceed to assume without evidence the incompetency of two pilots. And yet you refuse to assume the incompetency of the automation, which didn't mere fail, it countermanded with lethal force the 100% correct control inputs of the pilots. The idea they have to assert their sanity by flipping two switches, is about as ridiculous as automation not having to assert its sanity when it, by design, trusts a single point of failure one upping that by trusting it while it's failing and one upping that to extreme by taking action on it without any regard to other input sources including the pilots themselves. It's beyond obscene to me. I have personally trained private pilots with competency at identifying failed gauges, knowing which one to disregard, and estimating the missing values by inference from the remaining gauges. And this is in sub-200 hour pilots. The skill required for the instrument rating exceeds this particular automation in the AOA failure case by quite a lot. And the skill required for commercial and ATP ratings is even greater than that by quite a lot. Meanwhile MCAS upset from judgement of a single sensor induced such an unusual attitude it became unrecoverable. So the assumption of incompetency by pilots, while cutting automation all kinds of slack is to me 180 degrees backwards.
  - DuskStar 8y ago
    I think I misread difference training as different training there, my apologies. And the Ethiopian Air copilot had ~200 total hours, thus the comment. > You assume without evidence the problem manifests like runaway trim. And then proceed to assume without evidence the incompetency of two pilots. And yet you refuse to assume the incompetency of the automation, which didn't mere fail, it countermanded with lethal force the 100% correct control inputs of the pilots. The idea they have to assert their sanity by flipping two switches, is about as ridiculous as automation not having to assert its sanity when it, by design, trusts a single point of failure one upping that by trusting it while it's failing and one upping that to extreme by taking action on it without any regard to other input sources including the pilots themselves. It's beyond obscene to me. I didn't say that it manifests like runaway trim. I said that it manifests as "severely outside the norm trim", which it most certainly does. Unless you're saying that full nose down trim is normal? As for "asserting incompetence without evidence", they're certainly less competent than pilot #3 on the Lion Air flight the night before. (since, you know, that guy realized what was going on and how to resolve it) As for the automation being incompetent, yep you're right! It is! But airplane crashes don't happen for one reason - not commercial flights at least. They happen when a sequence of failures occurs, just like here. Boeing failed to consider the worst case behavior of MCAS, Lion Air maintenance fucked up, and the Lion Air pilots weren't able to diagnose the failure that morning. (The failure pipeline of the Ethiopian crash is still to be determined) As for why Boeing failed there... It's at least partly because the automatic trim controls weren't considered a safety critical part, since they had multiply redundant backups. It's just that the backups were "turn off electronic trim" and "grab the trim wheel and hold it in place", both of which require pilot action. (Allowing stuff like this to get grandfathered in is arguably a hole in the FAA's systems) > I have personally trained private pilots with competency at identifying failed gauges, knowing which one to disregard, and estimating the missing values by inference from the remaining gauges. And this is in sub-200 hour pilots. The skill required for the instrument rating exceeds this particular automation in the AOA failure case by quite a lot. And the skill required for commercial and ATP ratings is even greater than that by quite a lot. Meanwhile MCAS upset from judgement of a single sensor induced such an unusual attitude it became unrecoverable. Well then why was the issue so difficult for the pilots to diagnose here? There's a gauge for trim, and I'd hope it would be looked at when trying to figure out why you have to keep pulling back on the yoke so hard.