4 ms·
Just because you can't understand the value of deniability does not mean it has none. As for trade-offs, there don't seem to be any according to this paper. Fr
by kuzehanka 8y ago
Just because you can't understand the value of deniability does not mean it has none. As for trade-offs, there don't seem to be any according to this paper.
From TFA:
"We then present an practical attack that can be used
to compromise deniability in the Signal messaging protocol, and introduce some possible
countermeasures that restore deniability
[...]
Deploying the attack presented in this thesis requires not only having access to a TEE but also
compromising one of the parties to a communication."
Deniability is a powerful tool which one would rather have and not need than need and not have. Let research run its course for the betterment of protections available to us all.
- repolfx 8y agoDeploying the attack presented in this thesis requires not only having access to a TEE but also compromising one of the parties to a communication Essentially everyone with a PC has access to TEEs: beyond Intel SGX there's also the traditional static root of trust mechanism, which suffices for this, and also voids the paper's proposed solution; indeed the paper recognises that given a certain kind of TEE there appear to be no solutions. As for 'compromising one the parties', the point of deniability implemented cryptographically is that your counterparty in the conversation could encrypt messages such that you can't tell who encrypted them, i.e. an encrypted chat log could have been forged. So the adversary is the person you're talking to: they're already 'compromised'.