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> making the ultimate trust root "long term possession of the machine You probably don't want someone who steals your laptop to get access to your secrets afte

> making the ultimate trust root "long term possession of the machine You probably don't want someone who steals your laptop to get access to your secrets after a few days. Also, how would you know your "brand new" laptop wasn't interdicted by a hostile party while it was "having problems clearing at customs"? It is clear to me that your threat-model and Google's (they dogfood ChromeOS hardware extensively) are divergent. Chromebooks are not for everyone, and that's OK.

mindslight 8y ago
> You probably don't want someone who steals your laptop to get access to your secrets after a few days Obviously. I was describing the signature chain management. The encryption key management would be as it is. > how would you know your "brand new" laptop wasn't interdicted by a hostile party while it was "having problems clearing at customs"? >> The actual signing key that is loaded needs to be percolated up through the UI so the user can verify whom they're actually trusting > It is clear to me that your threat-model and Google's (they dogfood ChromeOS hardware extensively) are divergent. Chromebooks are not for everyone, and that's OK. Here we go again with the condescending simplistic conclusions...