4 ms·
I don't see why it can't work if the only way to change them is through a special UI at boot (the security of which can itself be protected with hardware-assist
by int_19h 8y ago
I don't see why it can't work if the only way to change them is through a special UI at boot (the security of which can itself be protected with hardware-assisted measures).
- saagarjha 8y agoBecause then other people can change the key without you knowing?
- 0815test 8y agoThis is trivially avoided by adding a setup password. Additionally, the system could display a hash of the keystore at boot - AIUI, Purism has worked on something like that.
- saagarjha 8y agoThis doesn't help ordinary users who aren't going to check the hash at boot.
- 0815test 8y agoOK, so we're talking about users who have unlocked the system themselves and enrolled a user key onto it, but aren't going to notice if it changes unexpectedly? Suuure.
- saagarjha 8y agoNo, you also have to include users who would like to run "stock" Chrome OS and continue trusting Google's keys. How do you protect them?
- int_19h 8y agoHow can they change it, unless they have direct physical access to your machine, and password to edit the key?
- saagarjha 8y agoDirect physical access isn’t that huge of a barrier. An ordinary user isn’t going to set a password anyways, putting themselves at risk, and even someone who is willing to use a password could have their device compromised before they receive it and have had a chance to set their own password.
- int_19h 8y agoIf I have direct physical access to your laptop, I can just put a hardware keylogger or rootkit in it. I don't see how any form of secure boot would be of much relevance in that scenario.