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> Ideally two peers could use a pre-shared secret or an offline-signed message to authenticate instead You can easily share offers and answers that are encrypt

> Ideally two peers could use a pre-shared secret or an offline-signed message to authenticate instead You can easily share offers and answers that are encrypted offline. It's how you share (i.e. signaling) that's the problem. I used gun.js the other day, and I used a js nacl impl to encrypt the offer/answer each way[0]. As the ipfs js dht gets better you'll be able to use that. Where you'll need a trusted third party is if you need a turn server due to firewall/nat issues (some say approx a quarter of net users). 0 - https://myscreen.live/faq.html#q-how-it-works-detail https://myscreen.live/faq.html#q-how-it-works-detail

dane-pgp 8y ago
That's incredible, and extremely close to the hypothetical use case I was imagining, which I thought was impossible to solve. Could you adapt that technology into a system for allowing a computer in one location to browse the web using the (relatively unrestricted) network connection of a computer in another location? I'm thinking of times when you're away from home (where your PC is running) and stuck using a web browser on another PC that has an aggressive filtering and/or monitoring policy. That's why in my threat model I imagined that there was a MitM that effectively operates a trusted CA. The difference between screen sharing and being a web proxy is presumably that the "sending" browser is also accepting navigation requests (from the "receiving" browser) which control the URL and scrolling/clicking of an iframe in the page that hosts the web app itself. I suppose that capturing the clicks on hyperlinks would be the hardest part, unless you could do some clever conversion between pixel locations and DOM elements.
SahAssar 8y ago
The TURN server doesn't need to be trusted as it never receives keys or sees unencrypted traffic, it only forwards encrypted traffic. It can still track metadata (who you're transferring data to), but it doesn't need to be trusted any more than your ISP.

dane-pgp 8y ago

That's incredible, and extremely close to the hypothetical use case I was imagining, which I thought was impossible to solve. Could you adapt that technology into a system for allowing a computer in one location to browse the web using the (relatively unrestricted) network connection of a computer in another location? I'm thinking of times when you're away from home (where your PC is running) and stuck using a web browser on another PC that has an aggressive filtering and/or monitoring policy. That's why in my threat model I imagined that there was a MitM that effectively operates a trusted CA. The difference between screen sharing and being a web proxy is presumably that the "sending" browser is also accepting navigation requests (from the "receiving" browser) which control the URL and scrolling/clicking of an iframe in the page that hosts the web app itself. I suppose that capturing the clicks on hyperlinks would be the hardest part, unless you could do some clever conversion between pixel locations and DOM elements.

SahAssar 8y ago

The TURN server doesn't need to be trusted as it never receives keys or sees unencrypted traffic, it only forwards encrypted traffic. It can still track metadata (who you're transferring data to), but it doesn't need to be trusted any more than your ISP.