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Those are not the only two options available. They could also allow you to provide your own signing keys, and then verify that whatever it is you're trying to b
by int_19h 8y ago
Those are not the only two options available. They could also allow you to provide your own signing keys, and then verify that whatever it is you're trying to boot is signed with those.
- saagarjha 8y agoThat’s a valid option but I haven’t seen any consumer hardware implement this properly. The issue seems to be that the ability to change signing keys makes it possible to change them without the end user noticing. Unless Google had a service that could deterministically burn your keys into the hardware at manufacture time instead of their own I can’t see this working: can you think of anything else?
- int_19h 8y agoI don't see why it can't work if the only way to change them is through a special UI at boot (the security of which can itself be protected with hardware-assisted measures).
- saagarjha 8y agoBecause then other people can change the key without you knowing?
- 0815test 8y agoThis is trivially avoided by adding a setup password. Additionally, the system could display a hash of the keystore at boot - AIUI, Purism has worked on something like that.
- saagarjha 8y agoThis doesn't help ordinary users who aren't going to check the hash at boot.
- 0815test 8y agoOK, so we're talking about users who have unlocked the system themselves and enrolled a user key onto it, but aren't going to notice if it changes unexpectedly? Suuure.
- saagarjha 8y agoNo, you also have to include users who would like to run "stock" Chrome OS and continue trusting Google's keys. How do you protect them?
- int_19h 8y agoHow can they change it, unless they have direct physical access to your machine, and password to edit the key?
- saagarjha 8y agoDirect physical access isn’t that huge of a barrier. An ordinary user isn’t going to set a password anyways, putting themselves at risk, and even someone who is willing to use a password could have their device compromised before they receive it and have had a chance to set their own password.
- int_19h 8y agoIf I have direct physical access to your laptop, I can just put a hardware keylogger or rootkit in it. I don't see how any form of secure boot would be of much relevance in that scenario.