4 ms·
It is on the other hand in some sense expressing hostility towards fellow humans for "don't be evil" Google to make this so hard to do. If they were more honest
by asveikau 8y ago
It is on the other hand in some sense expressing hostility towards fellow humans for "don't be evil" Google to make this so hard to do. If they were more honest in that saying it would indeed be simpler, and that is probably why the author is disappointed.
- jayd16 8y agoIn this case it feels really disingenuous. The Chromebook design goals are different than his wants. Its really nothing to get upset about.
- deogeo 8y agoWhy should we not get upset about design goals we dislike?
- jayd16 8y agoNot every design is for you.
- deogeo 8y agoAnd not every design is to the benefit of the consumer's it's targeted at - surely we should voice those concerns.
- vinkelhake 8y agoChromebooks are arguably the most secure consumer devices out there. This security is very much by design, has been there from day one and is of tremendous benefit to its target users.
- deogeo 8y agoWhy is it so popular to conflate security with lack of user control? Making Chromebooks tamper-evident is perfectly sufficient for security.
- saagarjha 8y ago…which is pretty much what they do? You flash your alternative OS on it and the Chromebook tells you that it can’t verify what it’s booting.
- deogeo 8y agoUnless you happen to press space or enter, in which case it wipes the device. That's a rather important detail.
- saagarjha 8y agoSpace then enter, and only during a little time window during the boot sequence: it's not easy to hit accidentally. Oh, and it warns you that you are reenabling OS verification for each step.
- craftinator 8y agoWhat an important clarification, I never hit those keys in that pattern, and neither does my cat! Glad I won't have to give my Chromebook a screwdriver enema again!
- saagarjha 8y agoIt is significantly easier to accidentally hit either of two keys than hit those two keys seconds apart in the right order. So I’d call that a pretty important clarification. > Glad I won't have to give my Chromebook a screwdriver enema again! If you’re willing to do that, you can disable this key sequence.
- 8y ago
- asveikau 8y agoI actually find Google's position more disingenuous and more arrogant. If a customer purchased some hardware they will have uses its creators did not intend or forsee. To take active measures to impede them or make it more difficult is aggression, and confusion about what it means to sell a product.
- Latteland 8y agoThe active measures are to block unwanted changes by a virus or whatever, protecting naive users from takeover. They explicitly tell you how to take this off if you want. Other companies don't do that. It's missing the whole point of chrome on to complain that it takes 5 minutes to overcome the cryptographically signed of that protects most users from harm.
- asveikau 8y agoI disagree. It is this same confusion, and I use that word intentionally, that makes people think user serviceability and safety from malware are mutually exclusive. Edit: let me elaborate on what I think is the reason. They are selling the hardware at a loss or close to it. When you put Linux on there you eat their revenue. Instead of being honest about this, they dress it up in a bunch of phony security talk. They don't want people reselling them as useful Linux workstations.
- Latteland 8y agoIt's possible they are selling the hardware at a loss but my experience is the opposite case. If you compare specs of laptops generally a chromebook laptop seems to cost more than a windows laptop of similar capabilities. I think the reason chromebooks cost more not less is because they sell fewer of them. You can buy a cheaper low end windows laptop and install any old os, usually.
- derefr 8y agoI don’t agree; Google shouldn’t have made it hard to do this—they should have made it impossible. (And making it merely hard just adds inconvenience while failing at their design goals.) The point of the Chromebook’s security approach (with the developer mode beep + notification, etc.) is to have a “Trusted Computing Base”, in the original, non-dystopian meaning of the phrase: you’re supposed to be able to tell, as a regular user, just by looking at/booting up a Chromebook, that it’s running Google-signed firmware/software. A Trusted Computing Base is precisely for the case where you do trust some particular third-party to be your IT admin (because, for example, they’re your school or employer, or—more likely—a subcontractor of one of those that MDM is being delegated to.) In such cases, you want to know that your device is in exactly the state that that party wants it to be in, and that no other party has been able to modify it. Google aren’t trying to make it impossible for you to use your Chromebook for whatever you want; that’s just a side-effect. Their goal is to make it impossible for someone who intercepts your Chromebook in shipment to install a rootkit on it, in a way where the device still appears to be (and act like) a Chromebook, with no sign that there’s anything wrong. Yes, Google is the IT admin of the device. Someone’s gotta be; in a Trusted Computing Base scenario, you remove the possibility of handing the thing off to a repair shop (because what is a repair shop—from the TCB perspective—but another attacker?) Essentially, a Chromebook has the same goal as a high-security lock: nobody should be able to pick it. Not even a locksmith. Not even the locksmith you hired because you lost your keys to the lock you own. Just like with encryption, you can’t leave a backdoor that only works for people with good intentions. You have to leave no backdoor at all—only a “front door.” In the case of a high-security lock, the “front door” is ordering new keys from the manufacturer, supplying your proof of purchase of the lock. In the case of a Chromebook, the “front door” is the signed update system, which allows one party (in this case the manufacturer, but in TCB Windows/macOS PCs this is your enterprise MDM admin) to manage everything. And also spy, if they want. But the two things are one and the same, really. The manufacturer of your high-security lock could break into your building, too. That’s why you pick a lock manufacturer you trust. Sadly, as the author proves, it’s not impossible to install a rootkit (in this case, a Linux distribution, but it could just as well be a keylogger-injected version of ChromeOS) onto a Chromebook, in a way that’d be invisible to the end-user (unless the end-user X-rays their devices upon receipt and uses ML to compare them to a standard blueprint, ala the brouhaha around spy chips surface-mounted onto the bus of Supermicro servers.)