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However, they did actively choose to not put in redundancy and the status systems in the cockpits which should have been done out of the box following any commo
by Timothycquinn 8y ago
However, they did actively choose to not put in redundancy and the status systems in the cockpits which should have been done out of the box following any common sense and failure mode analysis procedures. This decision itself is enough to bring this to court and as a result the internal communications on these decisions will be explored.
- syntheticcdo 8y agoI am not in aviation, but if they added redundant sensors and a new indicator, with an accompanying change to the flight manual for how to react to said indicator, wouldn't that have run contrary to the goal of "no new training/certification required"?
- Timothycquinn 8y agoI agree. That and the resulting sales impacts would seem to be the key motives to these decisions.
- bsmith 8y agoFrom what I've read, the assessed severity of the failure of aviation systems is rated. The rating for this system was not severe enough to require redundancy based on the assigned rating. I'll update my comment if I can find a reference.
- karmelapple 8y agoThere are likely document retention policies that limit how long the relevant emails and text messages may be retained. There could be Word files or other documentation that captures discussions still floating around though. Hopefully whoever is investigating this is acting fast to acquire the emails before they automatically get wiped.